The Michigan Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in 11 cases on Wednesday and Thursday, March 2 and 3, 2022. All oral arguments will be livestreamed beginning at 9:30 a.m. both days. The schedule of arguments (with specific dates and times for each case) will be posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page on February 14 (www.courts.michigan.gov /courts/supreme-court/schedule-of-oral-arguments).
Case summaries include:
161529
People of Michigan (attorney, Timothy Baughman)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v John Antonio Poole (attorney, Maya Menlo)
Defendant-Appellant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne - Morrow, B.)
The defendant is serving a life-without-parole sentence for first-degree murder for fatally shooting a man in 2001 when the defendant was 18 years old. In 2019, the defendant filed his third motion for relief from judgment. He cited Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), as a retroactive change in the law entitling him to file a successive motion. The trial court returned his successive motion for relief from judgment without deciding it and the Court of Appeals dismissed his delayed application for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment is “based on a retroactive change in the law,” MCR 6.502(G)(2), where the law relied upon does not automatically entitle him to relief; and (2) if so, whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or both.
162482
Rouch World, LLC, and Uprooted Electrolysis, LLC (attorney, David Kallman)
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
Department Of Civil Rights and Director of The Department of Civil Rights, (attorney, Tonya Jeter)
Defendants-Appellants.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Murray, C)
The plaintiffs are two Michigan companies that refused to provide services to customers who were either a same-sex couple or a transgender person. The customers filed complaints with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR). The MDCR started to investigate, in accordance with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission’s Interpretative Statement 2018-1, which interpreted discrimination “because of ... sex” under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. The plaintiffs then sued the MDCR, which moved for summary disposition, arguing that the term “sex” under the ELCRA includes sexual orientation and gender identity. The Court of Claims granted in part and denied in part the MDCR’s motion. With respect to gender identity, the Court of Claims followed Bostock v Clayton County, Georgia, 590 US __; 140 S Ct 1731 (2020), and held that the ELCRA applies to discrimination because of an individual’s gender identity. With respect to sexual orientation, the Court of Claims held that Interpretative Statement 2018-l was contrary to binding Michigan law, Barbour v Dep’t of Social Services, 198 Mich App 183 (1993), which holds that discrimination because of an individual’s sexual orientation is not prohibited under the ELCRA. Finally, the Court of Claims concluded that the plaintiffs’ constitutional issues regarding their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion remained pending. The MDCR filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, and then filed a bypass application in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the prohibition on discrimination “because of ... sex” in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., applies to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
162425
People of Michigan (attorney, Jon Wojtala)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Montez Stovall (attorney, Sofia Nelson)
Defendant-Appellant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne - Ramsey, K.)
In 1992, the defendant pled guilty in two separate cases to second-degree murder and felony-firearm. Both murders were committed when the defendant was 17 years old. The plea agreement included a sentence of parolable life in prison for second-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion and the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The defendant unsuccessfully pursued two motions for relief from judgment in which he argued that parolable life was the equivalent of life without parole because of the Parole Board’s policy that life means life. Following the holding in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), that Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), applies retroactively, the defendant filed another motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 published opinion, affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the defendant’s parolable life sentences for second-degree murder were the result of an illusory plea bargain; (2) whether the defendant’s sentences violate the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and/or the prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” found in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, where he was under the age of 18 at the time of the offenses; (3) whether the Parole Board’s “life means life” policy renders the defendant’s sentences unconstitutional under Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016); (4) whether, pursuant to Miller and Montgomery, the trial court was required to take the defendant’s youth into consideration when accepting his plea and ruling on his motion for relief from judgment; and (5) whether the Parole Board is similarly required to take his youth into consideration when evaluating him for release on parole.
154994
People of Michigan (attorney, Joshua Abbott)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v Robert Taylor (attorney, Conor Dugan)
Defendant-Appellant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb - Druzinski, D.,)
The defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder for a crime that was committed when he was 16 years old and was sentenced to life without parole. After MCL 769.25a was enacted, the trial court resentenced the defendant, but once again sentenced him to life without parole. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether, in exercising its discretion to impose a sentence of life without parole (LWOP), the trial court properly considered the “factors listed in Miller v Alabama, [567 US 460] (2012)” as potentially mitigating circumstances. MCL 769.25(6). See also People v Skinner, 502 Mich 89, 113-116 (2018). In particular, the parties shall address: (1) which party, if any, bears the burden of proof of showing that a Miller factor does or does not suggest a LWOP sentence; (2) whether the sentencing court gave proper consideration to the defendant’s “chronological age and its hallmark features,” Miller, 567 US at 477-478, by focusing on his proximity to the bright line age of 18 rather than his individual characteristics; and (3) whether the court properly considered the defendant’s family and home environment, which the court characterized as “far from optimal,” as weighing against his potential for rehabilitation.
161690-1
Kenneth McKenzie (attorney, Eric Restuccia)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Michigan Department of Corrections, State of Michigan, and Macomb Correctional Facility Warden, (attorney, Andrew Laurila)
Defendants-Appellants,
and Randall Haas,
Defendant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne - Hughes, M.)
—————
Fatima Olden,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Michigan Department of Corrections, State
of Michigan, and, Macomb Correctional
Facility Warden,
Defendants-Appellants.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne - Hughes, M.)
The Macomb Correctional Facility has a program that allows inmates to train leader dogs for the blind. The plaintiffs are prison guards who allege employment discrimination and failure to accommodate their allergies to the dogs. They filed separate but virtually identical lawsuits in the Wayne Circuit Court against the state of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), and the warden. Among other things, the plaintiffs allege that the warden discriminated against them on the basis of their allergies in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12101 et seq. They also allege that the state and the MDOC violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC § 794 et seq., by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for their allergies. The defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) in each case, asserting that the state has not consented to be sued in its own courts for claims derived from federal statutes. While MCL 600.6419 provides the Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state, MCL 600.6440 exempts claims for which an adequate remedy is available in federal courts. The defendants interpret the § 6440 exemption to mean that no Michigan courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law that can be remedied in the federal courts. The circuit court rejected this argument and denied the defendants’ motions for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion holding that circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims based on federal law. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether MCL 600.6440 divests the Court of Claims of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ causes of action arising under federal statute; and (2) if so, whether the circuit court shares concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over those causes of action.
162086
People of Michigan (attorney, Alena Clark)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Kemo Knicombi Parks (attorney, Angeles Meneses)
Defendant-Appellant,
(Appeal from Court of Appeals)
(Genesee - Bell, C.)
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, carrying a concealed pistol, and felony-firearm. The defendant was 18 years old at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life without parole for the murder conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or both. The Court directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in People v Poole (Docket No. 161529).
162211
People of Michigan (attorney, Louis Meizlish)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Alton Fontenot Jr. (attorney, Alona Sharon)
Defendant-Appellant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland - Grant, N)
The defendant is awaiting trial for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The defendant’s alcohol level was tested twice using the DataMaster breath-alcohol testing machine and both results were .09. The district court denied the prosecution’s motion to admit records of the DataMaster’s routine testing and inspections without the testimony of the inspector. The circuit court denied leave to appeal, but the Court of Appeals granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed in a 2-1 published opinion, holding that records of routine DataMaster testing and inspections are not testimonial in nature and that the Confrontation Clauses of the state and federal constitutions are not violated by introduction into evidence of the records without the testimony of the DataMaster inspector. The Court of Appeals also held that the records are admissible under MRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the administrative logs documenting the routine inspection of the DataMaster machine used to determine the defendant’s alcohol level, see Mich Admin Code R 325.2653(3), are testimonial and thus inadmissible under the Confrontation Clauses, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US 305 (2009); Bullcoming v New Mexico, 564 US 647 (2011); Williams v Illinois, 567 US 50 (2012); and People v Nunley, 491 Mich 686 (2012); and (2) whether the logs are admissible pursuant to MRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
162354-5, 162374
People of Michigan (attorney, Alena Clark)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Kino Dominque Christian (attorney, Mary Owens)
Defendant-Appellant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee - Farah, J)
—————
People of Michigan (attorney, Alena Clark)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Joshun Edwards (attorney, Richard Goodman)
Defendant-Appellant.
—————
People of Michigan (attorney, Alena Clark)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
C’Quan Michael Hinton (attorney, Kimberly Thomas)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendants were convicted of shooting and killing Robert Person. Prosecution witness Jarylle Murphy testified that he was present at the shooting, and he identified the defendants. The defense argued that Murphy was mistaken or lying. After their convictions were affirmed on appeal, the defendants discovered that they had not been provided with a transcript of Murphy’s first interview with the police. Based on this newly discovered evidence, the defendants filed motions for relief from judgment. They argued that the prosecution violated Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), and presented false and misleading testimony at trial, and that the new evidence entitled them to a new trial. The trial court denied relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the lower courts erred by holding that the suppressed October 16, 2007 interview transcript was not material to the defendants’ guilt such that they were not entitled to relief under Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963), and People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 149-150, 155 (2014). Additionally, defendant Hinton was directed to address his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
162416
Consumers Energy Company (attorney, Aaron Vorce)
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
v
Brian Storm and Erin Storm (attorney, Stephen van Stempvoort
Defendants-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants,
and
Lake Michigan Credit Union,
Defendant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kalamazoo - Lipsey, A.,)
The plaintiff owns a power line running in front of the defendants’ home. The plaintiff sought an easement from the defendants to maintain the power line and filed a complaint seeking to condemn the easement under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.51a et seq. The defendants filed a motion challenging the necessity of the easement, which the trial court granted. The defendants sought their attorney fees and costs, which the trial court also granted. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that MCL 213.56(6) required the plaintiff to file an application for leave to appeal, as opposed to a claim of appeal, from the decision regarding necessity. But the Court of Appeals reasoned that MCL 213.56(6) did not preclude review of the attorney fees and costs award, and vacated that award. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the trial court’s order finding that there was no public necessity to acquire the defendants’ property is “an order of the court ... determining public necessity” under MCL 213.56(6) that is appealable to the Court of Appeals only by leave; (2) whether MCL 213.56(6) deprives the Court of Appeals of discretion to consider the plaintiff’s appeal of right as on leave granted; and (3) whether the trial court’s ruling that there was no public necessity for the plaintiff’s proposed acquisition constituted a determination that the proposed acquisition was “improper” and supported an award of attorney fees and expenses under MCL 213.66(2).
162537-8
Bobbie Jo Kooman, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert J. Romig, and Terry Romig (attorney, Melissa Francis)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
Boulder Bluff Condominiums Units 73-123, 125-146, Inc., d/b/a Boulder Bluff Estates Condominium Association, and Gerow Management Company, Inc. (attorney, Drew Broaddus)
Defendants-Appellees.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ottawa CC - Hulsing, J.)
This case presents the question whether a condominium association’s refusal to allow installation of a railing on a front stoop to accommodate a disabled resident constitutes discrimination in a “real estate transaction” pursuant to MCL 37.1502(1)(b) and MCL 37.1506a(1)(a) of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq. The trial court held that there was no violation of the PWDCRA and granted partial summary disposition in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the statutory provisions in question only apply at the initial sale, lease, or rental of a dwelling. And because plaintiff Terry Romig purchased her condominium in 2009, the lower courts held that the defendants’ denial of her 2016 request to modify her condominium to accommodate the needs of her disabled ex-husband, who lived with her, did not violate the PWDCRA. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the defendants violated either MCL 37.1502 or MCL 37.1506a of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq., by denying the plaintiffs’ request to install a railing on the front stoop of their condominium.
162869
People of Michigan (attorney, Jack McIntyre)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Robert Daniel Hunt,
Defendant-Appellant.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Bowman, L.)
The defendant broke into a home while the family was asleep, stole some items and cash, and left. The family did not discover the home invasion until the next morning when they awoke to find the items missing. The defendant pled guilty to second-degree home invasion and other offenses. At sentencing, defense counsel challenged the scoring of 10 points for Offense Variable (OV) 9 (2 to 9 victims were placed in danger of physical injury or death) on the basis that the defendant did not come into contact with anyone during the commission of the crime and no one was placed in danger of death or physical injury because he left before the homeowners even knew he had been there. The trial court scored 10 points for OV 9 and sentenced the defendant to 4.5 to 22.5 years in prison. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the trial court erred in assigning 10 points to OV 9, MCL 777.39(1)(c), for placing 2 to 9 individuals in danger of physical injury or death.
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