The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in six cases on Wednesday, May 10, beginning at 9:30 a.m., in the Supreme Court courtroom on the 6th floor of the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa in Lansing. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page. Follow the Court on Twitter to receive regular updates as cases are heard.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, May 10, 2023
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
163981-2
In re JOSEPH & SALLY GRABLICK TRUST.
————
KATELYN BANASZAK, (attorney Jennifer Alberts),
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee PC - Barkey, J.)
DOROTHY GRABLICK and JUDITH ALMASY, (attorney Craig Fiederlein
Appellees,
and
JEFFREY GRABLICK, CRAIG L. WHITE, Trustee of the JOSEPH & SALLY GRABLICK TRUST, SALLY GRABLICK, J. M. DAVID HICKMOTT, LOUIS J. STEFANKO, NANCY HICKMOTT, JAMES HICKMOTT, and STEPHANIE ATCHISON,
Other Parties.
————
In re JOSEPH GRABLICK TRUST.
————
KATELYN BANASZAK, (attorney Jennifer Alberts)
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee PC - Barkey, J.)
DOROTHY GRABLICK and JUDITH ALMASY, (attorney Craig Fiederlein)
Appellees,
and
JEFFREY GRABLICK, CRAIG L. WHITE, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JOSEPH GRABLICK, SALLY GRABLICK, and J. M. DAVID HICKMOTT,
Other Parties.
Katelyn Banaszak was named in her stepfather Joseph Grablick’s will and trust, which were executed when Grablick was married to Banaszak’s mother. Twenty-five years later, Grablick divorced Banaszak’s mother. He died three months after that without revising his will and trust. Banaszak was a beneficiary of both. Under the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), bequests in a will or trust made by a “divorced individual” to a “relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse” are revoked if, after the divorce, the relative “is not related to the divorced individual by blood, adoption, or affinity.” MCL 700.2807(1)(a)(i); MCL 700.2806(e). Banaszak argues that she continued to be related to Grablick by affinity even after the divorce, and that the revocation provision of MCL 700.2807 does not apply. But the probate court held that Banaszak’s relationship by affinity with Grablick terminated as a matter of course when Grablick divorced her mother. The probate court granted summary disposition in favor of Dorothy Grablick (the decedent’s mother) and Judith Almasy (the decedent’s sister). Banaszak appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether divorce terminates a relationship by “affinity” under MCL 700.2806(e), thus causing “a disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse” to be revoked under MCL 700.2807(1)(a)(i). See Shippee v Shippee’s Estate, 255 Mich 35, 37 (1931). See also In re Bordeaux Estate, 37 Wash 2d 561, 565 (1950).
162968
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Michael Tesner)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Farah, J.)
JACQUELYNE FAYE TYSON, (attorney Michael Faraone)
Defendant-Appellant.
In the summer of 2016, the defendant believed that toxins were entering her apartment through the air vents. She went to the leasing office of her apartment complex to discuss the situation, then shot two of the office workers in the head, killing them. After a bench trial, the trial judge found her guilty but mentally ill of first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree murder, and two counts of felony-firearm. The defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the decision in People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223 (2001), holding that the Legislature abolished the defense of diminished capacity, was wrongly decided. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions in an unpublished opinion, but remanded for a ministerial correction to the judgment of sentence. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223 (2001), should be overruled; (2) if so, whether it should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Coldwater v Consumers Energy Co, 500 Mich 158, 172-174 (2017); and (3) if Carpenter is overruled, what relief, if any, the defendant is entitled to, given that she did not seek to admit evidence of diminished capacity at trial.
164110
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Michael Tesner)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Kelly, E.)
JOSEPH LEE JONES, (attorney to be appointed)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant pled guilty as a fourth-offense habitual offender to unarmed robbery, three counts of resisting or obstructing a police officer, and retaining without consent a financial transaction device. The plea agreement incorporated an evaluation under People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 (1993), for a sentence at the lower end of the guidelines minimum sentence range, which at the time was anticipated to be 29 to 114 months. But at sentencing, the actual guidelines range was determined to be 36 to 142 months. The trial court imposed a sentence of 50 to 180 months for unarmed robbery and lesser terms of imprisonment for the other offenses. The defendant attempted to withdraw his plea, arguing that he entered the plea with the understanding that the low end of the guidelines range was 29 months. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the 50-month minimum sentence was consistent with its Cobbs evaluation. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea where the trial court provided an estimated guidelines range with its preliminary evaluation of an appropriate sentence but did not advise the defendant that his final range could be different, see People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276, 283 (1993); (2) whether the trial court indicated it would consider a sentence within a particular range rather than at the very bottom of the sentencing guidelines; (3) if the trial court did indicate it was looking at a range, whether the range it was considering was sufficiently clear to enable appellate review of whether the trial court imposed a sentence consistent with its preliminary evaluation; and (4) whether the trial court imposed a sentence consistent with its preliminary evaluation.
-Break until 11:10 a.m.-
163949
SUNRISE RESORT ASSOCIATION, INC., GREGORY P. SOMERS, MELISSA L. SOMERS, and KARL BERAKOVICH, (attorneys William Henn, Andrea Nester)
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Cheboygan CC - Gauthier, A.)
CHEBOYGAN COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, (attorney Jennifer Schafer)
Defendant-Appellant.
The plaintiffs allege that modifications to a storm water drainage system made by the defendant resulted in a backup and overflow and caused damage to their real property. According to the plaintiffs, minor damage first occurred in 2015 and significant damage occurred in 2018. In 2020, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendant, seeking damages under the sewage-disposal-system-event exception to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., and injunctive relief to abate the ongoing trespass or nuisance. The defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that the damage claim was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations and that injunctive relief was not an available remedy. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, concluding that the damage claim was untimely because it accrued in 2015 and that injunctive relief was barred by governmental immunity and was untimely. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the plaintiffs’ claims accrued in 2015 and are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and (2) whether the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief is barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., and/or other applicable law, or is otherwise not obtainable as the functional equivalent of a claim for a writ of mandamus.
164311
In re PAROLE OF RICHARD ALLEN McBRAYER.
————
MACOMB COUNTY PROSECUTOR, (attorney Todd Schmitz)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Biernat, J)
RICHARD ALLEN McBRAYER, (attorney Jacqueline Ouvry)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MICHIGAN PAROLE BOARD, (attorney Steven Langschwager)
Defendant.
The appellant is serving concurrent prison terms of 20 to 40 years after pleading guilty to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He became eligible for parole on January 8, 2010. The Parole Board has granted parole to the appellant four times, but each time the Macomb Circuit Court has reversed the Parole Board after finding a clear abuse of discretion. The current appeal arises out of the circuit court’s most recent parole reversal in 2021. The appellant and the Parole Board both applied for leave to appeal this ruling in the Court of Appeals. After granting both applications and consolidating the two appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether “substantial and compelling circumstances” existed such that the Parole Board erred in failing to deviate from the guidelines; (2) whether and to what extent the Parole Board was required to consider the appellate opinions reversing its prior grants of parole to the appellant; and (3) whether and to what extent those prior appellate opinions should inform review of the Parole Board’s most recent exercise of discretion.
164055
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Deborah Blair)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Cox, K.)
MENAYETTA MICHELL YEAGER, (attorney Adrienne Young)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant fatally shot her boyfriend. She claims that on the day of the shooting she was driving a van when he struck her in the face, pulled her from the van by her hair, and tried to run over her with the van as he drove off. The defendant later arranged to meet with her boyfriend so he could return the van to her. According to the defendant, he threatened to kill her over the phone just before the meeting. The defendant claims she shot him because she feared that he was going to try to kill her. At trial, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder and second-degree murder, and the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder. The trial court granted a new trial, concluding that the defendant’s trial attorney performed ineffectively by failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed on the basis of People v Raper, 222 Mich App 475 (1997), which held that a jury’s rejection of second-degree murder in favor of first-degree murder reflects an unwillingness to convict on a lesser included offense such as manslaughter. Based on Raper, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant could not show that her attorney’s failure to request a manslaughter instruction was prejudicial. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the defendant’s trial attorney engaged in sound strategy by failing to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction; (2) whether the defendant’s fear of the decedent, based on the decedent’s physical assault of the defendant, carjacking of the defendant, and threats to the defendant, constituted adequate “heat of passion,” justifying a voluntary manslaughter instruction; (3) whether the decision in People v Raper, 222 Mich App 475 (1997), precludes a finding of prejudice from the absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and the jury was instructed on second-degree murder; and (4) if so, whether Raper was wrongly decided.
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