The sessions both days will begin at 9:30 a.m. in the 6th floor courtroom. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website. The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page. Those interested can follow the court on X (formerly Twitter) to receive regular updates as cases are heard.
The brief accounts that follow may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case, according to the court’s news release regarding the arguments.
The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, please contact the attorneys.
Scheduled for oral arguments in the morning session of March 12 is the first case from Macomb County — The People vs. Carl Thomas Masi.
According to court records, defendant has been charged with twelve counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving three minor complainants.
He brought a pretrial motion in the trial court to admit evidence that the complainants were sexually abused by a different relative before they came to live with him, that two of the complainants viewed pornography, and that the eldest complainant had inappropriately touched one of the younger complainants.
The trial court excluded the evidence under the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j, as applied in People v Morse, 231 Mich App 424, 437 (1998), which held that to admit evidence of a child complainant’s prior sexual abuse, the defendant must establish that another person was convicted of the abuse and that the prior abuse was significantly similar to the allegations against the defendant.
The trial court also held that the complainants’ alleged viewing of pornography constituted sexual conduct subject to the rape shield statute.
The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, held that evidence that a complainant viewed pornography, by itself, is not “sexual conduct” subject to the exclusionary bar of the rape shield statute, but remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the evidence is otherwise admissible under the Michigan Rules of Evidence.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether a child complainant’s act of viewing pornography during the course of sexual abuse by a relative constitutes “sexual conduct” for purposes of the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j; (2) whether the rape-shield statute precludes the admission of evidence that the child complainants were subjected to prior sexual abuse, to explain their age-inappropriate sexual knowledge, unless the defendant proves that another person was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving the complainants, and the facts underlying the previous conviction are significantly similar to the charged conduct to be relevant to the instant proceeding, see People v Morse, 231 Mich App 424, 437 (1998); and (3) whether barring evidence of the complainants’ prior sexual abuse and of a complainant’s viewing of pornography during the course of prior sexual abuse would constitute a denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation or the right to present a defense, see People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1
Another Macomb case on the early Wednesday docket is The People vs. Robert James Kardasz.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The trial court sentenced him to 30 to 45.8 years in prison. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the defendant’s conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court failed to explain why it exceeded the 25-year statutory minimum. On remand, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 to 40 years in prison. The judgment of sentence indicated that upon the defendant’s release, he would be subject to lifetime electronic monitoring and would be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court’s imposition of lifetime electronic monitoring and lifetime registration under SORA. The defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which held the case in abeyance for People v Lymon (164685). The Supreme Court subsequently ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., as amended by 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021 (the 2021 SORA), for the rest of his life constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 or cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII; (2) whether lifetime electronic monitoring, when imposed without an individualized assessment of the defendant’s recidivism risk and without providing a mechanism for removing the monitoring requirement, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII or cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, see generally People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021), but see People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 577 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016); (3) whether lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment as applied in this case; and (4) whether lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of US Const, Am IV or Const 1963, art 1, § 11, see State v Grady, 372 NC 509 (2019), and Park v State, 305 Ga 348 (2019), but see Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 581. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in People v Martin (Docket No. 166339).
During the Wednesday afternoon session, the court was scheduled to hear the third Macomb County case — The People vs. Christopher Robert Clinton.
Court records show the defendant and the complainant entered into an agreement for the defendant to provide and install a heating and cooling unit in a residential property. The complainant made a deposit of $5,500 for the equipment that was to be installed.
According to the complainant, the equipment was neither installed nor provided and he did not receive the return of his deposit. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of larceny by conversion of property with a value of $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, MCL 750.362; MCL 750.356(3)(a).
The trial court sentenced the defendant to time served and restitution of $5,500.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in an unpublished opinion.
The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for larceny by conversion under MCL 750.362, and specifically whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant converted the complainant’s property “to his own use,” see People v Christenson, 412 Mich 81, 86 (1981), and that “at the time the property was embezzled, converted, or hidden, the defendant intended to defraud or cheat the owner permanently of that property.” People v Mason, 247 Mich App 64, 72 (2001) (cleaned up).
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