The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in seven cases on Wednesday, January 21, beginning at 9:30 a.m. The cases will be heard in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing and will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys
Wednesday, January 21
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
167917
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, (attorney Stephanie Seery)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Jamo, J.)
NRK RX, INC. and RAAD KOUZA, (attorney Christopher Ryan)
Defendants-Appellees.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleged that the defendants billed Michigan Medicaid for more than half a million dollars for drugs that they failed to show were purchased from an authorized wholesaler. The DHHS demanded repayment, but the defendants refused. After obtaining an administrative decision establishing the defendants’ liability and the amount owed, the DHHS commenced a civil action in Ingham Circuit Court to recover the withheld overpayments, asserting that venue was proper in Ingham County pursuant to MCL 600.1631. The defendants filed a motion to change venue to Oakland County, citing MCL 600.1642(2) and MCL 600.1629(1)(a). The Ingham Circuit Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals denied the DHHS’s application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 published opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) the proper relationship between MCL 14.102, MCL 600.1631(a), MCL 600.1641(2), and MCL 600.1629 as applied to a civil action brought by the Department of Health and Human Services claiming statutory and common-law conversion; (2) if MCL 600.1629(1) controls, whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the original injury occurred in Oakland County; and (3) if MCL 14.102 and MCL 600.1631(a) control, whether these statutes apply only to actions in which the State of Michigan or the Attorney General is the named plaintiff or whether they also apply to an action brought by the Attorney General on behalf of a state department.
167920
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Susan Zuiderveen)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Van Buren CC - Brickley, K.)
JAYNEEL RAVINDRA JADE, (attorney Timothy Doman)
Defendant-Appellant.
The Van Buren County Sheriff’s Department and the Genesee County Sheriff’s department, as part of an undercover operation, posted an advertisement on an adult escort website called Skip the Games.
The advertisement posted photographs of a female with a stated age of 20, and listed various sexual acts that the female was offering for sale. The defendant contacted the phone number in the advertisement and began texting an undercover decoy. During the text messaging, the decoy asked him if he was okay with “younger chicks,” eventually stating that she was 15 years old. The defendant responded that she had to be 16. He also conducted a reverse look-up to determine the owner of the phone that he was texting and the search showed a single 34-year-old woman as the owner of the phone. After he insisted that the woman had to be 16, the decoy responded that she was 15 years old. The defendant proposed going out to eat with her. In response, the decoy again brought up exchanging sex for money. The defendant then had an unrecorded phone conversation with the decoy. Ultimately, he agreed to meet the decoy at a hotel. When he arrived, he was arrested and charged with child sexually abusive activity, accosting a child for immoral purposes, and two corresponding counts of using a computer to commit a crime. He filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on entrapment, which the trial court denied. Following the denial of his motion to dismiss, the defendant pleaded guilty to accosting a child for immoral purposes in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced him to seven days’ time served. After granting the defendant’s application for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court of Appeals erred by: (1) concluding that the standard of review for entrapment rulings requires consideration of whether the ultimate determination of entrapment is clearly erroneous as provided in People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 497 (2002), as opposed to a standard involving a conclusion or legal determination that is reviewed de novo, see People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 456 (2010); (2) relying on and applying the legal standard that police do not engage in entrapment by merely presenting a defendant with an opportunity to commit the crime with which he was charged without considering the defendant’s readiness and willingness to commit the charged crime, as stated in People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 68 (1990); and (3) affirming the trial court’s determination that the defendant was not entrapped, see Johnson, 466 Mich at 498.
167867
SHANNON BLACKMAN, (attorney Megan Reynolds)
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Calhoun CC - Kirkham, B.)
TYLER DAVID MILLWARD, (attorney TBD)
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
The defendant was a high school teacher who had a sexual relationship with the plaintiff when she was sixteen years old and one of his students. After the relationship was discovered, the defendant resigned from his teaching position in February 2018. The relationship continued, and on December 15, 2018, the plaintiff gave birth to a child. The parties executed an acknowledgement of parentage (AOP) after the child was born. The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for incidents that took place in 2017, as well as one count of witness intimidation for trying to convince the plaintiff to lie to police about their relationship. He was sentenced to 5.5 to 15 years in prison, with an earliest release date of November 12, 2025. In March 2023, the defendant filed a motion to establish parenting time. In response, the plaintiff sought to revoke the AOP under the Revocation of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1431 et seq., which provides remedies for a survivor of sexual assault who becomes pregnant by, and thereafter is raising the child of, her assailant. Following a hearing at which no evidence was taken, the trial court revoked the AOP, declared that the defendant had no parental rights to the child, allowed the plaintiff to amend the child’s birth certificate to reflect the revocation, declared any orders recognizing the defendant as the child’s father to be void, and cancelled an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion for parenting time. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the child’s conception was the result of nonconsensual sexual penetration. The Court of Appeals also held that the three-year limitations period set forth in MCL 722.1437(1) does not apply to the plaintiff’s claim to revoke the AOP under MCL 722.1445(2). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether an action to revoke an acknowledgement of parentage based upon a claim that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration, MCL 722.1445(2), is subject to the limitations period set forth in MCL 722.1437(1); and (2) whether the Calhoun Circuit Court erred by refusing to conduct a fact-finding hearing to determine whether the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration and, if so, the requirements of such a hearing. See MCL 722.1445(2).
167677
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Timothy Baughman)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Cox, K.)
MARIO CORTIZE JACKSON, (attorney Angeles Meneses)
Defendant-Appellee.
The defendant was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH) and other offenses for assaulting Latisha Ely. After the assault, Ely called her brothers, Cherron Ely and Ricardo Payne, for help. A gunfight ensued after her brothers arrived, and Cherron Ely was killed. The defendant was not charged with any crimes in relation to the gunfight. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of AWIGBH for assaulting Latisha Ely and was sentenced to 3½ to 10 years in prison. In scoring the guidelines minimum sentence range, the trial court assigned 100 points to Offense Variable (OV) 3 on the basis that a victim – Cherron Ely – was killed. MCL 777.33(1)(a). Under MCL 777.33(2)(b), 100 points should be assigned to OV 3 “if death results from the commission of a crime and homicide is not the sentencing offense.” The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing, concluding that it was improper to assign 100 points to OV 3 because Cherron Ely was shot and killed at some point after the defendant’s assault of Latisha Ely was completed. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the victim’s brother is also a “victim” for purposes of Offense Variable (OV) 3, MCL 777.33(1)(a), and if so, whether the defendant’s commission of the sentencing offense is a factual cause of the victim’s brother’s death so as to justify assigning 100 points to OV 3, MCL 777.33(2)(b). See People v Laidler, 491 Mich 339 (2012); People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120 (2009).
Wednesday, January 21
Afternoon Session – 1 p.m.
168205
AMY McCORMICK and ROBERT McCORMICK, (attorney Mark H. Cousens)
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Shapiro, D.)
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, (attorney Elizabeth M. Watza)
Defendant-Appellant.
The plaintiffs were employed as law professors by Michigan State University College of Law or Detroit College of Law (DCL) before it merged with defendant Michigan State University (MSU). The parties negotiated terms under which Robert McCormick agreed to retire and Amy McCormick agreed to continue as a professor emeritus. On December 31, 2019, all DCL employees were terminated and MSU provided an opportunity for these employees to be hired as MSU employees the next day. Amy McCormick declined the offer. The plaintiffs brought a breach-of-contract action against MSU regarding their original employment contracts with DCL, alleging that MSU fraudulently concealed the transfer agreement. The plaintiffs argued that MCL 600.5855, the fraudulent-concealment exception to the general notice provisions of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq., applied to their claims and granted them two years after the discovery of the agreement to initiate their suit. The Court of Claims initially found that the plaintiffs failed to plead affirmative acts by MSU to support a claim for fraudulent concealment, but after the plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege that DCL representatives made misleading affirmative statements, the Court of Claims ruled that the amended allegations supported a claim for fraudulent concealment, which would toll MCL 600.6431’s statutory notice provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the fraudulent-concealment exception in MCL 600.5855 applies to the statutory notice period in MCL 600.6431(1); (2) whether the holding in Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 641 (2004), that “actions taken before the alleged injury” are not “capable of concealing causes of action that did not yet exist” applies in this case, and, if so, how; and (3) when the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued, see Henry v Dow Chemical Co, 501 Mich 965 (2018), and Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133 (2017).
167716, 167720
LAWANNA SMITH, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JACQUELINE HARRIS, (attorney Tali Wendrow)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Grant, N.)
BEAUMONT HEALTH, (attorney Karen Beach)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
TRI COUNTY ORTHOPEDICS, PC, and JACK D. LENNOX, D.O.,
Defendants.
————
LAWANNA SMITH, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JACQUELINE HARRIS, (Tali Wendrow)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v\(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Grant, N.)
BEAUMONT HEALTH,
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys
Wednesday, January 21
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
167917
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, (attorney Stephanie Seery)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Jamo, J.)
NRK RX, INC. and RAAD KOUZA, (attorney Christopher Ryan)
Defendants-Appellees.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleged that the defendants billed Michigan Medicaid for more than half a million dollars for drugs that they failed to show were purchased from an authorized wholesaler. The DHHS demanded repayment, but the defendants refused. After obtaining an administrative decision establishing the defendants’ liability and the amount owed, the DHHS commenced a civil action in Ingham Circuit Court to recover the withheld overpayments, asserting that venue was proper in Ingham County pursuant to MCL 600.1631. The defendants filed a motion to change venue to Oakland County, citing MCL 600.1642(2) and MCL 600.1629(1)(a). The Ingham Circuit Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals denied the DHHS’s application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 published opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) the proper relationship between MCL 14.102, MCL 600.1631(a), MCL 600.1641(2), and MCL 600.1629 as applied to a civil action brought by the Department of Health and Human Services claiming statutory and common-law conversion; (2) if MCL 600.1629(1) controls, whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the original injury occurred in Oakland County; and (3) if MCL 14.102 and MCL 600.1631(a) control, whether these statutes apply only to actions in which the State of Michigan or the Attorney General is the named plaintiff or whether they also apply to an action brought by the Attorney General on behalf of a state department.
167920
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Susan Zuiderveen)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Van Buren CC - Brickley, K.)
JAYNEEL RAVINDRA JADE, (attorney Timothy Doman)
Defendant-Appellant.
The Van Buren County Sheriff’s Department and the Genesee County Sheriff’s department, as part of an undercover operation, posted an advertisement on an adult escort website called Skip the Games.
The advertisement posted photographs of a female with a stated age of 20, and listed various sexual acts that the female was offering for sale. The defendant contacted the phone number in the advertisement and began texting an undercover decoy. During the text messaging, the decoy asked him if he was okay with “younger chicks,” eventually stating that she was 15 years old. The defendant responded that she had to be 16. He also conducted a reverse look-up to determine the owner of the phone that he was texting and the search showed a single 34-year-old woman as the owner of the phone. After he insisted that the woman had to be 16, the decoy responded that she was 15 years old. The defendant proposed going out to eat with her. In response, the decoy again brought up exchanging sex for money. The defendant then had an unrecorded phone conversation with the decoy. Ultimately, he agreed to meet the decoy at a hotel. When he arrived, he was arrested and charged with child sexually abusive activity, accosting a child for immoral purposes, and two corresponding counts of using a computer to commit a crime. He filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on entrapment, which the trial court denied. Following the denial of his motion to dismiss, the defendant pleaded guilty to accosting a child for immoral purposes in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced him to seven days’ time served. After granting the defendant’s application for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court of Appeals erred by: (1) concluding that the standard of review for entrapment rulings requires consideration of whether the ultimate determination of entrapment is clearly erroneous as provided in People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 497 (2002), as opposed to a standard involving a conclusion or legal determination that is reviewed de novo, see People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 456 (2010); (2) relying on and applying the legal standard that police do not engage in entrapment by merely presenting a defendant with an opportunity to commit the crime with which he was charged without considering the defendant’s readiness and willingness to commit the charged crime, as stated in People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 68 (1990); and (3) affirming the trial court’s determination that the defendant was not entrapped, see Johnson, 466 Mich at 498.
167867
SHANNON BLACKMAN, (attorney Megan Reynolds)
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Calhoun CC - Kirkham, B.)
TYLER DAVID MILLWARD, (attorney TBD)
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
The defendant was a high school teacher who had a sexual relationship with the plaintiff when she was sixteen years old and one of his students. After the relationship was discovered, the defendant resigned from his teaching position in February 2018. The relationship continued, and on December 15, 2018, the plaintiff gave birth to a child. The parties executed an acknowledgement of parentage (AOP) after the child was born. The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for incidents that took place in 2017, as well as one count of witness intimidation for trying to convince the plaintiff to lie to police about their relationship. He was sentenced to 5.5 to 15 years in prison, with an earliest release date of November 12, 2025. In March 2023, the defendant filed a motion to establish parenting time. In response, the plaintiff sought to revoke the AOP under the Revocation of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1431 et seq., which provides remedies for a survivor of sexual assault who becomes pregnant by, and thereafter is raising the child of, her assailant. Following a hearing at which no evidence was taken, the trial court revoked the AOP, declared that the defendant had no parental rights to the child, allowed the plaintiff to amend the child’s birth certificate to reflect the revocation, declared any orders recognizing the defendant as the child’s father to be void, and cancelled an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion for parenting time. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the child’s conception was the result of nonconsensual sexual penetration. The Court of Appeals also held that the three-year limitations period set forth in MCL 722.1437(1) does not apply to the plaintiff’s claim to revoke the AOP under MCL 722.1445(2). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether an action to revoke an acknowledgement of parentage based upon a claim that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration, MCL 722.1445(2), is subject to the limitations period set forth in MCL 722.1437(1); and (2) whether the Calhoun Circuit Court erred by refusing to conduct a fact-finding hearing to determine whether the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration and, if so, the requirements of such a hearing. See MCL 722.1445(2).
167677
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Timothy Baughman)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Cox, K.)
MARIO CORTIZE JACKSON, (attorney Angeles Meneses)
Defendant-Appellee.
The defendant was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH) and other offenses for assaulting Latisha Ely. After the assault, Ely called her brothers, Cherron Ely and Ricardo Payne, for help. A gunfight ensued after her brothers arrived, and Cherron Ely was killed. The defendant was not charged with any crimes in relation to the gunfight. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of AWIGBH for assaulting Latisha Ely and was sentenced to 3½ to 10 years in prison. In scoring the guidelines minimum sentence range, the trial court assigned 100 points to Offense Variable (OV) 3 on the basis that a victim – Cherron Ely – was killed. MCL 777.33(1)(a). Under MCL 777.33(2)(b), 100 points should be assigned to OV 3 “if death results from the commission of a crime and homicide is not the sentencing offense.” The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing, concluding that it was improper to assign 100 points to OV 3 because Cherron Ely was shot and killed at some point after the defendant’s assault of Latisha Ely was completed. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the victim’s brother is also a “victim” for purposes of Offense Variable (OV) 3, MCL 777.33(1)(a), and if so, whether the defendant’s commission of the sentencing offense is a factual cause of the victim’s brother’s death so as to justify assigning 100 points to OV 3, MCL 777.33(2)(b). See People v Laidler, 491 Mich 339 (2012); People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120 (2009).
Wednesday, January 21
Afternoon Session – 1 p.m.
168205
AMY McCORMICK and ROBERT McCORMICK, (attorney Mark H. Cousens)
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Shapiro, D.)
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, (attorney Elizabeth M. Watza)
Defendant-Appellant.
The plaintiffs were employed as law professors by Michigan State University College of Law or Detroit College of Law (DCL) before it merged with defendant Michigan State University (MSU). The parties negotiated terms under which Robert McCormick agreed to retire and Amy McCormick agreed to continue as a professor emeritus. On December 31, 2019, all DCL employees were terminated and MSU provided an opportunity for these employees to be hired as MSU employees the next day. Amy McCormick declined the offer. The plaintiffs brought a breach-of-contract action against MSU regarding their original employment contracts with DCL, alleging that MSU fraudulently concealed the transfer agreement. The plaintiffs argued that MCL 600.5855, the fraudulent-concealment exception to the general notice provisions of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq., applied to their claims and granted them two years after the discovery of the agreement to initiate their suit. The Court of Claims initially found that the plaintiffs failed to plead affirmative acts by MSU to support a claim for fraudulent concealment, but after the plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege that DCL representatives made misleading affirmative statements, the Court of Claims ruled that the amended allegations supported a claim for fraudulent concealment, which would toll MCL 600.6431’s statutory notice provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the fraudulent-concealment exception in MCL 600.5855 applies to the statutory notice period in MCL 600.6431(1); (2) whether the holding in Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 641 (2004), that “actions taken before the alleged injury” are not “capable of concealing causes of action that did not yet exist” applies in this case, and, if so, how; and (3) when the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued, see Henry v Dow Chemical Co, 501 Mich 965 (2018), and Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133 (2017).
167716, 167720
LAWANNA SMITH, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JACQUELINE HARRIS, (attorney Tali Wendrow)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Grant, N.)
BEAUMONT HEALTH, (attorney Karen Beach)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
TRI COUNTY ORTHOPEDICS, PC, and JACK D. LENNOX, D.O.,
Defendants.
————
LAWANNA SMITH, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JACQUELINE HARRIS, (Tali Wendrow)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v\(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Grant, N.)
BEAUMONT HEALTH,
Defendant,
and
TRI COUNTY ORTHOPEDICS, PC, and JACK D. LENNOX, D.O., (attorney Lauren Rhoads)
Defendants-Appellants.
In this medical-malpractice case, the plaintiff’s standard-of-care expert stopped communicating with the plaintiff’s counsel prior to his deposition. The plaintiff filed an amended witness list naming a new expert, but the trial court struck it because it was filed after the witness list deadline. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the witness list, which the trial court denied. The trial court eventually granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s expert was not qualified to sign the plaintiff’s affidavit of merit. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, vacated the trial court’s orders and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend the witness list without first considering the factors in Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27 (1990). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Oakland Circuit Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the factors set forth in Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27 (1990), during its consideration of the plaintiff’s motion to amend her witness list to add an expert witness. See MCR 2.401(I)(2).
167154
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Katie Jory)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Kelly, E.)
DAVID HENRY SERGES, (attorney Maya Menlo)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant performed odd jobs for residents of a neighborhood in Burton. One of the defendant’s elderly female clients was found dead from blunt force trauma. The decedent’s neighbor suggested that police investigate the defendant, who had been seen in the area around the time the decedent would have been murdered. Nothing at the crime scene implicated the defendant. He was taken into custody and questioned. He admitted that he knew the decedent, but denied harming her. The police arrested the defendant on outstanding misdemeanor warrants and while he was jailed, police took his clothing into custody and sent it to the Michigan State Police Crime Laboratory for testing without the defendant’s consent. Laboratory personnel determined that a small spot of blood on the defendant’s pants contained the decedent’s DNA. Based on this forensic analysis, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The defendant’s trial attorney did not move to suppress the evidence of the victim’s blood on the defendant’s pants. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a published opinion. Among other things, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant, due to his status as a jail inmate, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his clothing and that he was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence of the forensic analysis of the defendant’s clothing. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the defendant was unlawfully arrested such that his pants should be excluded as the result of an unreasonable seizure under US Const, Am IV or Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 11; (2) if the defendant was lawfully arrested, whether police violated the defendant’s rights under US Const, Am IV or Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 11, by having his pants tested for DNA without a warrant while in possession of the pants due to the defendant’s detention in jail, People v Trudeau, 385 Mich 276 (1971); People v Carr, 370 Mich 251 (1963); and (3) whether the defendant’s trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the seizure and testing of the clothing.
and
TRI COUNTY ORTHOPEDICS, PC, and JACK D. LENNOX, D.O., (attorney Lauren Rhoads)
Defendants-Appellants.
In this medical-malpractice case, the plaintiff’s standard-of-care expert stopped communicating with the plaintiff’s counsel prior to his deposition. The plaintiff filed an amended witness list naming a new expert, but the trial court struck it because it was filed after the witness list deadline. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the witness list, which the trial court denied. The trial court eventually granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s expert was not qualified to sign the plaintiff’s affidavit of merit. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, vacated the trial court’s orders and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend the witness list without first considering the factors in Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27 (1990). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Oakland Circuit Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the factors set forth in Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27 (1990), during its consideration of the plaintiff’s motion to amend her witness list to add an expert witness. See MCR 2.401(I)(2).
167154
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Katie Jory)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Kelly, E.)
DAVID HENRY SERGES, (attorney Maya Menlo)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant performed odd jobs for residents of a neighborhood in Burton. One of the defendant’s elderly female clients was found dead from blunt force trauma. The decedent’s neighbor suggested that police investigate the defendant, who had been seen in the area around the time the decedent would have been murdered. Nothing at the crime scene implicated the defendant. He was taken into custody and questioned. He admitted that he knew the decedent, but denied harming her. The police arrested the defendant on outstanding misdemeanor warrants and while he was jailed, police took his clothing into custody and sent it to the Michigan State Police Crime Laboratory for testing without the defendant’s consent. Laboratory personnel determined that a small spot of blood on the defendant’s pants contained the decedent’s DNA. Based on this forensic analysis, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The defendant’s trial attorney did not move to suppress the evidence of the victim’s blood on the defendant’s pants. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a published opinion. Among other things, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant, due to his status as a jail inmate, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his clothing and that he was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence of the forensic analysis of the defendant’s clothing. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the defendant was unlawfully arrested such that his pants should be excluded as the result of an unreasonable seizure under US Const, Am IV or Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 11; (2) if the defendant was lawfully arrested, whether police violated the defendant’s rights under US Const, Am IV or Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 11, by having his pants tested for DNA without a warrant while in possession of the pants due to the defendant’s detention in jail, People v Trudeau, 385 Mich 276 (1971); People v Carr, 370 Mich 251 (1963); and (3) whether the defendant’s trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the seizure and testing of the clothing.
––––––––––––––––––––
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