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For several years, the punitive anti-innovation approach of California dominated state-level debates on Artificial Intelligence policy. Last year the tide started turning, with “Right to Compute” emerging as a more balanced alternative for preserving the benefits of AI innovation while protecting against the risks. Several states are considering Right to Compute laws in their 2026 legislative sessions. Michigan should do the same.

For several years, the punitive anti-innovation approach of California dominated state-level debates on Artificial Intelligence policy. Last year the tide started turning, with “Right to Compute” emerging as a more balanced alternative for preserving the benefits of AI innovation while protecting against the risks. Several states are considering Right to Compute laws in their 2026 legislative sessions. Michigan should do the same.

The Right to Compute is rooted in a simple principle: Lawful access to computing is not a privilege to be granted by the government but a natural extension of rights we already possess that should be protected by the government. Government regulation of artificial intelligence should be limited to what is necessary to protect the public.

Montana passed the first Right to Compute law in April 2025. The Montana law received strong bipartisan support, including unanimous approval in the state senate. The Montana law requires that new regulations for artificial intelligence be “demonstrably necessary and narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government interest in public health or safety.”

AI-intensive industries and developers know that when they operate in Montana, the state will protect their rights to innovate while requiring them to follow a short list of critical requirements for operating safely. Indeed, the Montana Right to Compute law contains two important regulatory requirements — that companies create “a shutdown mechanism allowing reversion to human control within a reasonable time,” and that companies conduct an annual risk-management review.

At least three additional states are moving forward with their own Right to Compute bills in 2026 — Ohio, New Hampshire, and South Carolina.

Ohio’s bill was introduced in 2025 and carried over into 2026. The bill has had four committee hearings already. Nearly all speakers spoke in favor of the bill. The testimony against the bill focused on water usage by data centers but did not oppose the main concept of Right to Compute.

Abundance Institute Director of Public Policy Taylor Barkley, writing in the Columbus Dispatch, described how the Ohio Right to Compute bill focused on balancing risks and rewards of AI development.

“The Right to Compute Act is not a ‘hands-off’ approach to AI,” Barkely wrote. “It simply restores constitutional balance: The government must justify restrictions, not the other way around. Fraud, deception and harassment remain illegal, and critical-infrastructure systems must still follow recognized safety standards.”

In New Hampshire, HB 1124 has been the subject of one hearing to date. The bill sponsor had an AI tool provide testimony for what might be the first time in the country. Another group of legislators is separately seeking to advance an amendment to enshrine Right to Compute in the New Hampshire constitution.

South Carolina’s bill was introduced in January and has been referred to committee. It appears to be modeled on the Montana law, with similar protections and specific requirements for developers.

So far Michigan has given relatively little attention to AI regulation. Four bills have been introduced in the current session. None passed, and all take a California-like punitive approach by proposing restrictions on AI development. To the extent there has been discussion of artificial intelligence in Michigan, it has focused on data center zoning and resource usage issues, which can be addressed separately from Right to Compute issues.

States that adopt Right to Compute laws can position themselves to gain a critical competitive advantage over those that don’t. “Advanced manufacturing, AI research, biomedical innovation, energy optimization, and next-generation education tools all rely on access to affordable, scalable computing,” Abundance Institute Director of State Government Affairs Bryce Chinault testified in New Hampshire. “HB 1124 sends a clear signal to entrepreneurs, researchers, and employers: New Hampshire is open to builders.”

Michigan has an opportunity to get ahead of other states by adopting its own Right to Compute law. Artificial intelligence is a transformative technology, much like electricity or the internet when they emerged. It will define U.S. competitiveness, productivity, and prosperity for decades. With the right approach, artificial intelligence can expand manufacturing productivity, improve health and education, and create new economic opportunities for everyone in the state.

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Ted Bolema is a senior fellow with the Mackinac Center and an antitrust and competition fellow with the Innovators Network Foundation.

Despite the scale of its military assault on Iran, the Trump administration’s reasons for entering into war have been inconsistent and vague, from regime change to the destruction of nuclear weapons, preempting military action by Israel, or the more chilling decree of following “God’s divine plan.”

(THE CONVERSATION) — Despite the scale of its military assault on Iran, the Trump administration’s reasons for entering into war have been inconsistent and vague, from regime change to the destruction of nuclear weapons, preempting military action by Israel, or the more chilling decree of following “God’s divine plan.”

Politicians, pundits and even social media users have been quick to point out the contradictions of these justifications – regime change is impossible from the air, especially when you kill the alternatives, and weren’t those nuclear weapons already destroyed?

But the “why” for entering into war matters beyond scoring political points.

Why, and how, a president engages in military action has serious implications for the constitutional authority of any wartime action and, specifically, whether Congress has any hope of checking the warmaking of a president.

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War powers and ‘imminent threats’

Under Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, only Congress has the authority to declare war.

One way around this, as the Trump administration and congressional Republicans have half-heartedly attempted, is to avoid calling this conflict a “war.” The messaging didn’t stick. In fact, President Donald Trump has already used the term repeatedly.

The more viable option for sidestepping the need to have Congress declare a war is for the president to claim authority under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which grants a president the power to involve the armed forced in “hostilities” or “potential hostilities” without congressional approval only under extraordinary conditions of “imminent threat.”

At least one member of the administration appears to understand this nuance: Secretary of State Marco Rubio – notably, a former member of Congress himself. Rubio used the specific terminology “imminent threat” when discussing why the Trump administration began the bombing.

Absent a truly imminent threat, the president is required by the resolution to “consult regularly” with Congress before and after engaging in military action. Importantly, the military action is limited to 60 days, during which the president must “report to the Congress periodically” with updates to keep the legislative branch informed.

After 60 days, the president must, the resolution says, “terminate any use of United States Armed Forces.” If a president wants to wage a war longer than that, that requires an additional declaration by Congress. Such a declaration would require votes similar to a bill being passed.

In 2002, for example, after initiating a “war on terror,” President George W. Bush eventually turned to Congress to pass the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq. This permitted Bush to send troops into Iraq and further pursue a war that would last a decade.

In today’s case, by claiming that the Iranian regime was posing an imminent threat to the United States, the president can more easily circumvent congressional approval for military action and then turn to Congress after the fact if further action is needed.

As we recently discussed on our podcast about Congress, “Highway to Hill,” Congress has been continually ceding its power to the executive branch for decades. Deflection on military authority goes back even further: Congress hasn’t formally declared war since World War II – yes, despite involvement in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and many other places. But the Constitution doesn’t mince words on who’s responsible for entering the U.S. into war: Congress.

And how this war is ultimately framed by the White House has implications for the types of oversight Congress can perform to limit or curtail military action.

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The limited powers of the war powers resolution

Congress, seemingly caught off guard by the Trump administration’s actions in Iran, has responded in a few ways. Perhaps unsurprisingly, responses have fallen largely along party lines.

Following the initial bombings, U.S. Sen. Tim Kaine, a Democrat from Virginia, introduced a war powers resolution to prevent further military action in Iran. In the House, U.S. Reps. Ro Khanna, a California Democrat, and Thomas Massie, a Republican from Kentucky, introduced a similar bipartisan resolution. The votes failed in both chambers despite overwhelming support from Democrats.

On the Republican side, Rubio’s explanation for the military action seemed to appease many key members of Congress. Senate Majority Leader John Thune, a South Dakota Republican, claimed the president had the authority to move forward with military action in Iran.

Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, a Louisiana Republican, said that any congressional attempt to limit the president’s warmaking power would be “frightening” and “dangerous.”

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Public accountability in congressional hearings

But Congress has two more traditional and frequently used oversight tools at its disposal: oversight hearings and the power of the purse.

Oversight hearings provide members of Congress an opportunity to not only question and investigate the executive branch’s activity, but also to provide their constituents with this fact-finding work and draw attention to policy issues. As some recent oversight hearings indicate, these can also be opportunities for partisan jabs and “made for TV” moments.

But there is evidence that they produce results.

Following tense oversight hearings on excessive spending in the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Kristi Noem was fired from her position in early March 2026.

In the 1970s, the Church Committee – named for its formidable chair, U.S. Sen. Frank Church of Idaho – held extensive hearings that included eye-opening testimony about clandestine U.S. intelligence activities abroad and domestically. The Church Committee recommended, and Congress subsequently enacted, dozens of sweeping reforms to foreign intelligence collection activities, as well as restraints on future efforts by the U.S. government to assassinate people.

Although the Trump administration has provided closed-door briefings to members of Congress, Democratic senators are asking for more. They are calling for Department of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Rubio to come before congressional committees to explain their reasoning and plans for the Iran war.

Not only do oversight hearings provide members of Congress with an opportunity to investigate and question an administration’s actions, but they bring that discussion to the public. This transparency provides constituents with information about how their tax dollars are being spent, what their members of Congress think, and may even sway public opinion.

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Power of the purse

But perhaps the most powerful tool that Congress has is its power of the purse, outlined in Article 1 of the Constitution.

Military actions in Iran are already costing an estimated US$1 billion a day, or as U.S. Rep. Tom Cole of Oklahoma, the Republican House Appropriations Committee chair, put it: “a lot.”

As the war drags on, the Trump administration will need more money – money that only Congress can dole out. Unlike war powers resolutions, which in this case would limit military action after the fact, new spending cannot occur until Congress writes and passes legislation appropriating additional funds.

But this would constitute a blank check for a foreign war. And that might be too much to ask of members of Congress in both parties, particularly as the U.S. faces a historic deficit and cuts to safety net programs.

And as public opinion on both military action in Iran and the state of the economy continues to sour, a vote for more military spending might well overtax any remaining goodwill of voters and members of Congress alike.

In fact, the political pressure on Congress to put its foot down could become so immense that lawmakers may have to do something – like their job.

As the American and Israeli war with Iran unfolds, some American Christians are speaking of the conflict in biblical terms, mapping end-time prophecies on to current events in the Middle East.

(THE CONVERSATION) — As the American and Israeli war with Iran unfolds, some American Christians are speaking of the conflict in biblical terms, mapping end-time prophecies on to current events in the Middle East.

In a sermon on March 1, 2026, for example, John Hagee, founder of Christians United for Israel, described the war as part of a divine plan. “Prophetically, we’re right on cue,” he said. Later, he prayed that “God Almighty is brought onto the battlefield and the enemies of Zion and the enemies of the United States can be destroyed before our eyes. Let God arise and let his enemies be scattered.”

Meanwhile, Christian singer and activist Sean Feucht referred to “the end-time open doors of what (God) is going to do in Iran when this regime is prayerfully removed.”

This type of apocalyptic thought has roots in the 19th century, when many American preachers turned toward more literal readings of the Bible. Those readings also emphasized the Bible’s account of God promising the “Holy Land” to Abraham and his descendants. But Christian Zionism’s influence on politics has grown over the past half-century, as I write about in my book “Zeal for Zion.” Today, that mindset seems to be moving into the halls of the American government and the military.

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End of an age

“Dispensationalism” is a Protestant idea that human history is divided into different ages, or dispensations, that each unfold God’s plan for the world. Churches that embrace it, which tend to be evangelical, believe that the current dispensation is coming to an end. 
But that time can be ushered in only by great suffering, a period known as “Jacob’s tribulations.” Israel is the place where they believe these tribulations will begin, and where they will culminate in Jesus’ Second Coming.

In the U.S., the most powerful manifestation of dispensationalist and apocalyptic thought is Christian Zionism. The term refers to many Christians’ strong support for Israel, rooted in the biblical account of God’s covenant with the Hebrew people.

Even before Israel was established, conservative evangelicals have long been enamored of the idea of a Jewish return to Zion. In the 1940s, Protestant emphasis on these biblical narratives influenced American public opinion and helped make the case for a Jewish state.

But in the first two decades of Israel’s history, from 1948-68, fundamentalist Christians had few direct allies among either Israeli or American Jews. Neither evinced much interest in working with conservative Christians, some of whom were involved in missionary work. Why would Jewish groups ally themselves with Christians seeking to convert them?

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Turning point

The outcomes of Israel’s 1967 war with a coalition of Arab states changed that situation. From Syria, Israel conquered and occupied the Golan Heights; and from Jordan, East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan. From Egypt, Israel won the Sinai Peninsula, from which it eventually withdrew, and the Gaza Strip.

As Israeli journalist Gershom Gorenberg noted, “The Six Day War did more than create a new political and military map in the Middle East. It also changed the mythic map, in a piece of the world where myths have always bent reality.”

In some evangelicals’ view, Israel’s victories in the Arab-Israeli wars were the triumph of divinely ordained good over evil. For them, God’s plan in history, revealed to humanity in the Bible, was now unfolding in the Holy Land. Many conservative Christians view the Jewish return to Israel as a prelude to the Second Coming.

This theology had appeared before the 1967 war. But afterward, it placed its hope on the fulfillment of a quite specific scenario: that the government of the Jewish state would rebuild the ancient Temple in Jerusalem and thus set the stage for the end of days. With the return of Jesus, the historic mission of the Jewish people would be fulfilled. Many Jews would perish, and the remnants would become the vanguard of believers in Jesus.

This scenario, once promoted by small groups within some Protestant denominations, had by the 1990s become widely diffused in popular culture. The “Left Behind” series, apocalyptic novels inspired by the biblical Book of Revelation, sold over 80 million copies.

After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, hostility toward Islam also fueled Christian conservatives’ support for Israel. Televangelist Pat Robertson, for example, said Islam was “violent at its core.”

Around the same time, in a significant political shift, many American Jewish organizations welcomed Christian Zionists’ support. As Israel’s treatment of Palestinians attracted more criticism, the Israeli government and some Jewish groups in the U.S. began to rethink their relationship to conservative Christians.

In 2002, the Anti-Defamation League, an advocacy group that has historically promoted liberal and civil rights causes, took out an ad in major American newspapers. In that ad it reprinted a statement by Ralph Reed, former head of the Christian Coalition, which was founded by televangelist Pat Robertson.

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Into government

Today, however, it seems Christian Zionism’s influence has risen to a new level in government.

Since the strikes on Iran began on Feb. 28, 2026, the Military Religious Freedom Foundation, a watchdog group, reported over 200 complaints about commanders telling troops across branches of the U.S. armed forces that the current war with Iran was part of a divine plan, invoking biblical ideas about the “end times.”

“Anytime Israel or the U.S. is involved in the Middle East, we get this stuff about Christian nationalists who’ve taken over our government, and certainly our U.S. military,” Air Force veteran Mikey Weinstein, the foundation’s president, told The Guardian.

A further sign of Christian Zionism moving into government was the 2025 appointment of former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel. Among the most influential and prominent Christian Zionists, Huckabee, a Baptist minister, for years led “Holy Land tours” to Israel.

“I believe it is a special place because God made it special,” Huckabee told conservative Christian activist Charlie Kirk, who was assassinated in September 2025. “I believe the Scripture, Genesis 12: Those who bless Israel will be blessed, those who curse Israel will be cursed. I want to be on the blessing side, not the curse side.”

The Department of Homeland Security issued a policy memo in February 2026 that could lead to the detention of refugees who are legally in the country.

By Ashley Sanchez
University of Notre Dame

(THE CONVERSATION) — The Department of Homeland Security issued a policy memo in February 2026 that could lead to the detention of refugees who are legally in the country.

The new policy states that “DHS may arrest and detain a refugee who has lived in the United States for at least one year and has not yet acquired” lawful permanent resident status. Approximately 100,000 refugees could be at risk for such arrest and detention.

The policy rescinds a 2010 DHS policy that limited the agency’s ability to arrest refugees. The 2010 policy was cited in a 2026 court order that temporarily prohibited agents with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement from arresting refugees in Minnesota in an effort to root out cases of fraud in the refugee admissions process.

As an immigration scholar, I believe the new DHS memo constitutes a massive departure from previous policy – one that could result in the detention of thousands of people who have lawful immigration status.

To better understand the new DHS policy and the change it represents, it’s helpful to clarify what it means to be a refugee.

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Refugees flee persecution

Refugees flee their countries to escape persecution due to their race, religion, nationality or political opinion. Under U.S. immigration law, a refugee is someone who arrived in the U.S. through an official U.S. resettlement process.

After registering as a refugee abroad, the process for being resettled in the U.S. can take years – sometimes decades – and requires rigorous background checks.

Upon arrival, refugees are permitted to live and work indefinitely in the U.S. They are also eligible to “adjust” their immigration status to lawful permanent resident, also known as a “green card,” after one year in the country.

At issue with the new DHS policy is the interpretation of Section 209 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the statute that governs refugee adjustments and moves them from refugee status to lawful permanent resident.

Section 209 states that refugees who have been physically present in the U.S. for one year and haven’t yet received lawful permanent resident status “shall, at the end of such year period, return or be returned to the custody of DHS for inspection and admission” as a lawful permanent resident.

Historically, this has meant that refugees are required to undergo a secondary screening, through an interview or paper application, before receiving their green cards.

But DHS is now interpreting the language in Section 209 to impose a duty on refugees to voluntarily return to DHS custody – which it defines as detention – after one year in the country. This is despite the fact that refugees are not even eligible for legal permanent resident status until they have been in the country for a full year, putting refugees in an impossible situation.

Essentially, every refugee could face imprisonment unless immigration officials review and approve their green card applications at exactly the one-year mark.

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History of refugee policy

The language in Section 209 arose after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, a law that created our current refugee resettlement framework. Prior to this, there was no fixed legal mechanism for resettling refugees in the U.S.

Instead, the government responded to humanitarian crises largely on an ad hoc basis. It temporarily allowed people into the U.S. from Vietnam and Cuba.

Once here, those individuals had no long-term legal status unless Congress managed to pass after-the-fact legislation authorizing them to apply for green cards, as it did for Cubans with the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.

The Refugee Act of 1980 was meant to solve this problem. It established a legal mechanism for refugee resettlement. It created a new refugee immigration status and ensured that refugees are eligible for permanent residency.

The earliest regulations implementing Section 209 show the “returned to custody” language was satisfied by attending an interview at a local immigration office. It was part of the green card process that was eventually replaced with a paper application.

The regulations implementing that change state that the “‘custody’ requirement for refugees applying for adjustment of status” can be met by filing an application.

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What the DHS memo means for refugees

So, what normally happens if a refugee fails to submit their application?

Usually, nothing.

Until relatively recently, refugees weren’t even permitted to file for lawful permanent residence until after living in the country for a year.

Previous ICE guidance recognized that even if a refugee fails to file a green card application at all, they still maintain their lawful refugee immigration status. The failure to submit an application did not create any basis to deport a refugee. Therefore, absent other factors, immigration detention was inappropriate.

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What will refugees do now?

Immigration attorneys are advising their refugee clients to file for lawful permanent status immediately, if they have not yet done so, to reduce the risk of detention. But that may not be enough.

The DHS memo states that a refugee “may be considered to have voluntarily returned to custody” if they filed their application and complied with any interviews. But the wording of the memo leaves open the door to detain anyone who has not yet had their application approved.

This leads to another issue, which is DHS administrative delays. The government currently takes approximately 12 months to approve refugee green card applications for requests it’s willing to process.

In January 2026, another DHS policy put an indefinite hold on all applications for individuals from a list of 39 countries. Consequently, applications for refugees from countries including Haiti, Afghanistan and Republic of the Congo are not being reviewed at all.

This means that refugees who have done everything right could be imprisoned indefinitely under this policy, because the U.S. government is refusing to judge their applications.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration has capped refugee admissions for 2026 to a record low of 7,500.

At least one federal lawsuit has already been filed to challenge this new policy.

What happens now depends on how far DHS is willing to go and whether the courts allow it to do so.

The U.S. military was able “to strike a blistering 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours of its attack on Iran” thanks in part to its use of artificial intelligence, according to The Washington Post.

(THE CONVERSATION) The U.S. military was able “to strike a blistering 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours of its attack on Iran” thanks in part to its use of artificial intelligence, according to The Washington Post. The military has used Claude, the AI tool from Anthropic, combined with Palantir’s Maven system, for real-time targeting and target prioritization in support of combat operations in Iran and Venezuela.

While Claude is only a few years old, the U.S. military’s ability to use it, or any other AI, did not emerge overnight. The effective use of automated systems depends on extensive infrastructure and skilled personnel. It is only thanks to many decades of investment and experience that the U.S. can use AI in war today.

In my experience as an international relations scholar studying strategic technology at Georgia Tech, and previously as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy, I find that digital systems are only as good as the organizations that use them. Some organizations squander the potential of advanced technologies, while others can compensate for technological weaknesses.

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Myth and reality in military AI

Science fiction tales of military AI are often misleading. Popular ideas of killer robots and drone swarms tend to overstate the autonomy of AI systems and understate the role of human beings. Success, or failure, in war usually depends not on machines but the people who use them.

In the real world, military AI refers to a huge collection of different systems and tasks. The two main categories are automated weapons and decision support systems. Automated weapon systems have some ability to select or engage targets by themselves. These weapons are more often the subject of science fiction and the focus of considerable debate.

Decision support systems, in contrast, are now at the heart of most modern militaries. These are software applications that provide intelligence and planning information to human personnel. Many military applications of AI, including in current and recent wars in the Middle East, are for decision support systems rather than weapons. Modern combat organizations rely on countless digital applications for intelligence analysis, campaign planning, battle management, communications, logistics, administration and cybersecurity.

Claude is an example of a decision support system, not a weapon. Claude is embedded in the Maven Smart System, used widely by military, intelligence and law enforcement organizations. Maven uses AI algorithms to identify potential targets from satellite and other intelligence data, and Claude helps military planners sort the information and decide on targets and priorities.

The Israeli Lavender and Gospel systems used in the Gaza war and elsewhere are also decision support systems. These AI applications provide analytical and planning support, but human beings ultimately make the decisions.

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The long history of military AI

Weapons with some degree of autonomy have been used in war for well over a century. Nineteenth-century naval mines exploded on contact. German buzz bombs in World War II were gyroscopically guided. Homing torpedoes and heat-seeking missiles alter their trajectory to intercept maneuvering targets. Many air defense systems, such as Israel’s Iron Dome and the U.S. Patriot system, have long offered fully automatic modes.

Robotic drones became prevalent in the wars of the 21st century. Uncrewed systems now perform a variety of “dull, dirty and dangerous” tasks on land, at sea, in the air and in orbit. Remotely piloted vehicles like the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper or Israeli Hermes 900, which can loiter autonomously for many hours, provide a platform for reconnaissance and strikes. Combatants in the Russia-Ukraine war have pioneered the use of first-person view drones as kamikaze munitions. Some drones rely on AI to acquire targets because electronic jamming precludes remote control by human operators.

But systems that automate reconnaissance and strikes are merely the most visible parts of the automation revolution. The ability to see farther and hit faster dramatically increases the information processing burden on military organizations. This is where decision support systems come in. If automated weapons improve the eyes and arms of a military, decision support systems augment the brain.

Cold War era command and control systems anticipated modern decision support systems such as Israel’s AI-enabled Tzayad for battle management. Automation research projects like the United States’ Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, or SAGE, in the 1950s produced important innovations in computer memory and interfaces. In the U.S. war in Vietnam, Igloo White gathered intelligence data into a centralized computer for coordinating U.S. airstrikes on North Vietnamese supply lines. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s strategic computing program in the 1980s spurred advances in semiconductors and expert systems. 
Indeed, defense funding originally enabled the rise of AI.

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Organizations enable automated warfare

Automated weapons and decision support systems rely on complementary organizational innovation. From the Electronic Battlefield of Vietnam to the AirLand Battle doctrine of the late Cold War and later concepts of network-centric warfare, the U.S. military has developed new ideas and organizational concepts.

Particularly noteworthy is the emergence of a new style of special operations during the U.S. global war on terrorism. AI-enabled decision support systems became invaluable for finding terrorist operatives, planning raids to kill or capture them, and analyzing intelligence collected in the process. Systems like Maven became essential for this style of counterterrorism.

The impressive American way of war on display in Venezuela and Iran is the fruition of decades of trial and error. The U.S. military has honed complex processes for gathering intelligence from many sources, analyzing target systems, evaluating options for attacking them, coordinating joint operations and assessing bomb damage. The only reason AI can be used throughout the targeting cycle is that countless human personnel everywhere work to keep it running.

AI gives rise to important concerns about automation bias, or the tendency for people to give excessive weight to automated decisions, in military targeting. But these are not new concerns. Igloo White was often misled by Vietnamese decoys. A state-of-the-art U.S. Aegis cruiser accidentally shot down an Iranian airliner in 1988. Intelligence mistakes led U.S. stealth bombers to accidentally strike the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, in 1999.

Many Iraqi and Afghan civilians died due to analytical mistakes and cultural biases within the U.S. military. Most recently, evidence suggests that a Tomahawk cruise missile struck a girls school adjacent to an Iranian naval base, killing about 175 people, mostly students. This targeting could have resulted from a U.S. intelligence failure.

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Automated prediction needs human judgment

The successes and failures of decision support systems in war are due more to organizational factors than technology. AI can help organizations improve their efficiency, but AI can also amplify organizational biases. While it may be tempting to blame Lavender for excessive civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip, lax Israeli rules of engagement likely matter more than automation bias.

As the name implies, decision support systems support human decision-making; AI does not replace people. Human personnel still play important roles in designing, managing, interpreting, validating, evaluating, repairing and protecting their systems and data flows. Commanders still command.

In economic terms, AI improves prediction, which means generating new data based on existing data. But prediction is only one part of decision-making. People ultimately make the judgments that matter about what to predict and how to use predictions. People have preferences, values and commitments regarding real-world outcomes, but AI systems intrinsically do not.

In my view, this means that increasing military use of AI is actually making humans more important in war, not less.

Several prominent universities, including Columbia University and the University of Pennsylvania, made headlines in 2025 in a dizzying back-and-forth with the federal government. The Trump administration cut large amounts of research funding to universities. Some pushed back, and others hatched settlements to get the money restored.

By Brendan Cantwell
Michigan State University

(THE CONVERSATION) — Several prominent universities, including Columbia University and the University of Pennsylvania, made headlines in 2025 in a dizzying back-and-forth with the federal government. The Trump administration cut large amounts of research funding to universities. Some pushed back, and others hatched settlements to get the money restored.

So how have these confrontations between higher education and the White House played out over the past year, now that they have dropped out of the spotlight?

Amy Lieberman, education editor at The Conversation U.S., spoke with Brendan Cantwell, a scholar of higher education at Michigan State University, to understand how the Trump administration is adopting a more subtle tactic to block funding to universities.

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Where does Trump’s attempt to withdraw funding from universities stand?

Several universities entered into settlements with the Trump administration in 2025 – including the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia University, Cornell University, Northwestern University and Brown University – to restore research funding the government pulled. We don’t really know how those deals are being enforced. They appear to be working, in the sense that the government has not complained and the schools have received the targeted funding that the government canceled.

In another case, Harvard University never entered into a deal with the Trump administration and instead sued the government in April 2025 to block a US$2.7 billion funding freeze. Federal courts restored Harvard’s funding, but we don’t have a lot of specific knowledge on how this funding was restored. The government appealed this ruling in December 2025.

In October, the administration also proposed an agreement, called the Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education, that would provide funding advantages for universities that agreed to change their admissions practices to cap the percentage of international students that they enroll, among other policy shifts.

There was almost universal skepticism and condemnation of this deal among schools, and it fell apart, aside from a few small schools not initially invited that said they would sign on.

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What is your research focused on right now?

I am thinking about how the administration is shifting from making targeted deals with universities and more toward using legislative and rule-making processes to achieve its goals.

These deals with universities in 2025 were really unusual. I think they are going to become less and less effective for the administration, as they face losses in court. Universities have also realized that they could not agree to a deal with the administration and still prevail.

Now, we are seeing the administration impose its priorities in other ways, in part through President Donald Trump’s 2025 big tax and spending cuts and new rules at the Department of Education. This approach retains the Trump administration’s ideological preferences, but uses more normal routes.

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Are they placing more limits on research funding, or what is the goal?

The Trump administration in 2025 wanted to reduce funding dramatically to the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation – and to NASA, in particular. Congress rejected those requests and instead produced what was essentially a level funding picture for university research.

What isn’t clear is how much of the money appropriated by Congress is going to make its way into new grants for research. Much of the funding that Congress appropriated, so far, has not been released.

We know that in 2025, federal agencies made fewer grants than in past years. The grants the government did make tended to be a bit larger, and winning a grant became more competitive. This approach gives the administration more flexibility in funding the kinds of projects that it prefers.

In my assessment, it seems likely that the government will do the same again this year. The administration may also attempt to withhold a portion of the money that Congress appropriated for scientific research.

Over the course of the year, we are going to see how this plays out. Is the administration just dragging its feet, using whatever administrative levers it has to slow-walk things? Or, is it going to attempt to divert research funding to other priorities and now spend it in a way that Congress did not appropriate? We don’t really know. I do know that universities and scientific research organizations are very concerned about this possibility.

If this money doesn’t start to flow, we probably will see legal challenges from universities and scientific organizations.

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How long does it take for delayed funding to become evident in research?

The effects are almost immediate and then build over time.

Some of the grants we expected to be awarded in the first two months of the year have not been awarded. In 2025, thousands of grants were canceled and some agencies made up to 25% fewer grants than they had awarded in prior years.

As the year goes on, unless the pace of awards increases, we can expect the total amount of money that goes out to researchers to be even lower than it was in 2025.

This is the bottom line: Congress continues to fund research, but all money is not making its way to researchers.

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What does it look like as the Trump administration shifts its tactics?

One of the ways the administration seems like it will go after universities is by making it harder for students to qualify for student loans. The tax and spending cuts bill, for example, put caps on federal student loan borrowing at the graduate level.

This is more of a normal conservative idea; that the availability of student loans has encouraged universities to offer more low-quality programs at the undergraduate and graduate level which don’t help students. I think these conservative ideas with some mainstream appeal may be the focus of the administration moving forward, in addition to administrative foot-dragging.

Overall, I think that we may see less of these big, direct confrontations between the Trump administration and universities. It worked in the sense that they got some initial concessions from universities, but it is not really clear if those concessions amounted to a major victory for the administration.

The political boundaries of research are also becoming narrower. You can’t do climate research and expect to get federal funding right now.

I think that the federal government is going to continue to restrict money from universities. There is going to be this persistent, progressive shrinking of research funding. But the administration has either not been willing or able to impose a sudden collapse of university funding and bring schools to their knees.