The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in 13 cases on Wednesday, January 10, and Thursday, January 11, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on both days in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa in Lansing. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, January 10
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
164557
THE GYM 24/7 FITNESS, LLC, and All Others Similarly Situated, (attorney Philip Ellison)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Kelly, M.)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Ann Sherman)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff claims that it and all gyms and fitness centers are entitled to just compensation under the federal and state takings clauses, Const 1963, art 10, § 2; US Const, Am V, based on the six-month closure as part of Executive Orders addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. The defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), but the Court of Claims denied the motion, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the closure was reasonable and not arbitrary. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff did not establish a physical or regulatory taking. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the defendant was entitled to summary disposition on the putative class’s alleged inverse condemnation and takings claims under the Michigan and United States constitutions, Const 1963, art 10, § 2; US Const, Am V. In particular, the Supreme Court has directed the parties to address: (1) whether the temporary impairment of business operations can be a categorical regulatory taking if there are no reasonable alternative uses of the business property during the period in which its intended and normal use is prohibited, see Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992); and (2) if not, whether the Court of Appeals properly weighed the factors from Penn Central Transp Co v City of New York, 438 US 104 (1978), in addressing the plaintiff’s claims involving a temporary prohibition of its normal business operations, see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 334 (2002) (leaving open the possibility that a temporary taking could constitute a taking under Penn Central); Lingle v Chevron USA Inc, 544 US 528, 538-539 (2005) (“Primary among [the Penn Central] factors are ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’ In addition, the ‘character of the governmental action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred.”) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in Mount Clemens Recreational Bowl v DHHS Director (Docket No. 165169) for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in this case.
165169
MOUNT CLEMENS RECREATIONAL BOWL, INC., K.M.I., INC., and MIRAGE CATERING, INC., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, (attorney Justin Majewski)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Gleicher, E.)
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION, and GOVERNOR, (attorney Ann Sherman)
Defendants-Appellees.
After the Governor, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Director, and the Chairperson of the Liquor Control Commission issued orders during the COVID-19 pandemic requiring the closure of bars, restaurants, and banquet halls, or for them to maintain limited occupancy rates, the plaintiffs filed suit in Macomb Circuit Court. The plaintiffs alleged a regulatory takings claim and claims of tortious interference. After the defendants transferred the case to the Court of Claims, the plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer the case back to the Macomb Circuit Court. The Court of Claims denied the plaintiffs’ motion to transfer and granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion, relying on its analysis of similar claims in The Gym 24/7 Fitness, LLC v State of Michigan, 341 Mich App 238 (2022). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the plaintiffs’ motion to transfer the case back to Macomb Circuit Court should have been granted because there is a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial in takings cases against the state; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals properly weighed the factors from Penn Central Transp Co v City of New York, 438 US 104 (1978), in addressing the plaintiffs’ claims involving a temporary prohibition of its normal business operations, see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 334 (2002) (leaving open the possibility that a temporary taking could constitute a taking under Penn Central); Lingle v Chevron USA Inc, 544 US 528, 538-539 (2005) (“Primary among [the Penn Central] factors are ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’ In addition, the ‘character of the governmental action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred.”) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in The Gym 24/7 Fitness, LLC v State of Michigan (Docket No. 164557).
163120
LYNDA DANHOFF and DANIEL DANHOFF, (David Parker)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland - Grant, N.)
DANIEL K. FAHIM, M.D. and MICHIGAN HEAD & SPINE INSTITUTE, (attorney Scott Saurbier)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DANIEL K. FAHIM, M.D., PC, KENNETH P. D’ANDREA, D.O., and WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, d/b/a BEAUMONT HOSPITAL-ROYAL OAK,
Defendants.
After Lynda Danhoff suffered complications following back surgery during which her colon was perforated, she and her husband (plaintiffs) brought a claim for medical malpractice against the doctor who performed the surgery, his medical practice, and the hospital where the surgery was performed. The defendants filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiffs’ standard-of-care expert was not qualified because his testimony was based solely on his experience and background and not upon scholarly authority. The trial court granted summary disposition in the defendants’ favor, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the application, and after hearing oral argument granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether this Court’s decisions in Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634 (2010), and Elher v Misra, 499 Mich 11 (2016), correctly describe the role of supporting literature in determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony on the standard of care in a medical malpractice case; (2) if not, what a plaintiff must demonstrate to support an expert’s standard-of-care opinion; and (3) whether the plaintiffs’ standard-of-care expert met the standards for determining the reliability of expert testimony and was thus qualified to testify as an expert witness under MRE 702 and MCL 600.2955 or whether a Daubert hearing was necessary before making that decision. See Kumho Tire Corp Ltd v Carmichael, 526 US 137 (1999); General Electric Co v Joiner, 522 US 136 (1997); Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579 (1993); Elher; Edry.
164902-4
SHAREEF EL-JAMALY, (attorney Mark Granzotto)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Gibson, S.)
KIRCO MANIX CONSTRUCTION, (attorney David Houbeck) KIRCO DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, (attorney Lincoln Herweyer)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
KIRCO-OM PLYMOUTH, LLC, OERLIKON METCO (US), INC., GHAFARI ASSOCIATES, LLC, GHAFARI, INC., NATIONAL SAFETY RESOURCE CENTER, LLC, CHRISTOPHER STREB, and DTE ENERGY COMPANY,
Defendants.
—————
HAREEF EL-JAMALY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Gibson, S.)
KIRCO MANIX CONSTRUCTION, LLC, KIRCO DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and OERLIKON METCO (US), INC., (attorney Jeffrey Gerish)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
KIRCO-OM PLYMOUTH, LLC, GHAFARI ASSOCIATES, LLC, GHAFARI, INC., NATIONAL SAFETY RESOURCE CENTER, LLC, CHRISTOPHER STREB, DTE ENERGY COMPANY, and DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Defendants.
—————
SHAREEF EL-JAMALY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Gibson, S.)
KIRCO MANIX CONSTRUCTION, LLC, and KIRCO DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
KIRCO-OM PLYMOUTH, LLC, OERLIKON METCO (US), INC., GHAFARI ASSOCIATES, LLC, GHAFARI, INC., NATIONAL SAFETY RESOURCE CENTER, LLC, CHRISTOPHER STREB, DTE ENERGY COMPANY, and DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Defendants.
The plaintiff was electrocuted while working at a construction site when he raised a large metal tool in the air to the point that it either touched or came very close to touching the power lines above the construction site. As is relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff sued Kirco Manix Construction, LLC, the general contractor, DTE Electric Company, which owned and operated the power lines above the construction site, and Oerlikon Metco (US), Inc., the company that planned to lease the building that was being constructed. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals consolidated the defendants’ appeals and, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the trial court and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the defendants. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) Kirco Manix Construction, LLC cannot be held liable under the common work area doctrine; and (2) DTE Electric Company did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.
Wednesday, January 10
Afternoon Session – 1 p.m.
164790
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Emil Semaan
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Servitto, E.)
RONALD SCOTT, (attorney Garrett Burton)
Defendant-Appellee.
The defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I) and other crimes. The prosecutor filed a pretrial motion to admit other-acts evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion by excluding the other-acts evidence. The defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, but the trial court held a trial while the application was pending. The other-acts evidence was admitted at trial, and a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of CSC I. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s interlocutory application after the trial was completed. The defendant appealed his convictions as of right, and the Court of Appeals followed People v Washington, 321 Mich App 276 (2017) (Washington I), and held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct proceedings while the defendant’s interlocutory application was pending in the Supreme Court. The defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to hold the case in abeyance pending the Court of Appeals’ second decision in Washington, which had been remanded to the Court of Appeals. On remand, the Court of Appeals followed People v Washington (On Remand), 329 Mich App 604 (2019) (Washington II), and held that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to try the defendant. The defendant once again appealed to the Supreme Court, and while his application was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in People v Washington, 508 Mich 107 (2021) (Washington III). The Supreme Court remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Washington III. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, vacated the defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding that, under Washington III, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try the defendant while admitting other-acts evidence that was the subject of the interlocutory application for leave to appeal pending in the Supreme Court. The defendant again appealed to the Supreme Court, which has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court’s decision in Washington III applies to the interlocutory appeal at issue in this case. In addressing that question, the Supreme Court has directed the parties to specifically address: (1) whether there was an automatic stay in effect during the pendency of the defendant’s application for leave to appeal in this Court, see MCR 2.614(D), MCR 6.126, MCR 7.205(E)(3), MCR 7.208(A), MCR 7.209(A)(1), MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a), and MCR 7.305(C)(6)(a); (2) whether any stay prevented the trial court from holding trial or whether it only prevented action related to the non-final order challenged in the prosecutor’s interlocutory appeal, see Alice L v Dusek, 492 F3d 563, 564-565 (CA 5, 2007); Quick-Sav Food Stores, Ltd v Estate of Mattis, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 19, 2010 (Docket No. 285414), pp 2-3, citing 5 Am Jur 2d, Appellate Review, § 387, p 174; and (3) whether any stay deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction or whether the failure to comply with that stay was a procedural error subject to review for harmlessness.
164534
KAREN LOUISE BELLMORE, (attorney Jonathan Green)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Smith, L.)
FRIENDLY OIL CHANGE, INC.,
Defendant,
and
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney James Woolard)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff was allegedly injured when she fell into a service pit while the oil was being changed on her vehicle at a commercial establishment. The fall occurred after an employee of the establishment asked the plaintiff to look at a filter that was still embedded in the vehicle. The plaintiff sued her insurer, State Farm, for personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act. The trial court granted partial summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff, finding that her injuries arose out of the maintenance of a motor vehicle within the meaning of MCL 500.3105(1) and that she would be entitled to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3106(1), the no-fault act’s parked vehicle provision. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of State Farm. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the plaintiff’s alleged injuries did not arise out of the maintenance of a motor vehicle; and (2) the plaintiff’s vehicle was not “parked” as a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the plaintiff’s alleged injuries arose out of the “maintenance . . . of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” within the meaning of MCL 500.3105(1); and (2) whether the plaintiff’s motor vehicle was “parked” within the meaning of MCL 500.3106(1).
165273
ROBERT WHITNEY, (attorney Stephen Lovell)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Midland CC - Carras, S.)
NEAL MARVIN WILCOXSON and PMP ENTERPRISES, INC., (attorney Daniel Lobello)
Defendants-Appellants.
A semi-truck rear-ended the plaintiff’s uninsured vehicle while it was parked on the shoulder of the road. The plaintiff filed a two-count complaint for negligence and ownership liability. The trial court granted summary disposition to the defendants, holding that the plaintiff could not recover damages pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(c) because his vehicle was not insured when the accident occurred. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded for further proceedings, reasoning that MCL 500.3135(2)(c) did not bar the plaintiff from recovering damages because he was not “operating” his vehicle at the time the injury occurred. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the plaintiff was “operating . . . his own vehicle at the time the injury occurred” for purposes of MCL 500.3135(2)(c). The Supreme Court directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Bellmore v Friendly Oil Change, Inc (Docket No. 164534).
Thursday, January 11
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
165109
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Christopher Candela)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Eaton CC - Maurer, J.)
MAHER MOHAMMAD GHUNAIM, (attorney John Ujlaky)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was hospitalized following an alleged suicide attempt. While the defendant was in the hospital, a detective interviewed him regarding allegations that he sexually abused his stepdaughter. During the interview, the detective did not advise the defendant of his Miranda rights, and the defendant allegedly admitted to the abuse. The prosecution charged the defendant with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Prior to the preliminary examination, the defendant moved to suppress the statements he made during the interview. The district court granted the motion but bound the defendant over to the circuit court based on the victim’s testimony. The defendant renewed his motion to suppress in the circuit court, which denied the motion after determining that: (1) the interview in the hospital was not a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings; and (2) the statement was not otherwise involuntary. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the defendant was subjected to a “custodial interrogation” without being advised of his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), when he was a hospitalized patient; and (2) whether the defendant’s statements were “freely and voluntarily made,” People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334 (1988).
164685
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Jon Wojtala)
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Hathaway, D.)
CORA LADANE LYMON, a/k/a COREY LYMON, (attorney Jessica Zimbelman)
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of three counts of torture, three counts of unlawful imprisonment, one count of felonious assault, and one count of felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him to 10.5 to 20 years in prison for each of the torture convictions, 7 to 15 years for each of the unlawful imprisonment convictions, 2 to 4 years for the felonious assault conviction, and two years for the felony-firearm conviction, to be served consecutively to the other sentences. Because two of the defendant’s unlawful imprisonment convictions involved minors, the trial court required him to register as a Tier I offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq. See MCL 28.722(q) and (r)(iii). The defendant argued on appeal, among other things, that because his convictions of unlawful imprisonment of a minor lacked a sexual component, his placement on the sex offender registry violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and Article I, § 16 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order removing him from the sex offender registry. The defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his torture convictions and that the offense variables were misscored. The prosecution filed an application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant, arguing that the requirements of the 2021 SORA do not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application, but granted the prosecution’s cross-application to address whether requiring a defendant to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., as amended by 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021 (the 2021 SORA), for a non-sexual crime, such as unlawful imprisonment of a minor, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 or cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII.
165166
MICHIGAN FARM BUREAU et al., (attorney Zachary Larsen)
Plaintiffs-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Stephens, C.)
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES, AND ENERGY, (attorney Elizabeth Morrisseau)
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
The Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) administers the issuance of general permits for pollutant discharges from point sources in Michigan regulated under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 33 USC 1311(a); 33 USC 1342(a)(1). Among the plaintiffs are concentrated livestock or animal feeding operations (CAFOS) regulated by EGLE under this permitting process. When EGLE issued a number of new permit conditions with its 2020 General Permit, a group of CAFOs petitioned for a contested case proceeding under Mich Admin Code R 323.2192(c), the Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, MCL 24.201 et seq., and MCL 324.3113(3). Before a contested case proceeding could be held, the plaintiffs (an overlapping group) filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Court of Claims challenging the same permit conditions. Finding that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the contested case proceeding before challenging the conditions in court, the Court of Claims granted EGLE summary disposition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under MCR 2.116(C)(4). The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, held that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but for a different reason. According to the Court of Appeals, the permit conditions were unpromulgated rules that could be challenged in a declaratory judgment action under MCL 24.264, but before the plaintiffs could file that action, they had to first challenge the validity of these rules by seeking an administrative declaratory ruling per MCL 24.264. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the unpromulgated new permit conditions that the Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy seeks to enforce with its 2020 General Permit can be challenged by way of a declaratory judgment under MCL 24.264; (2) whether a contested case proceeding under MCL 324.3112(5) and MCL 24.271 to MCL 24.288 is “an exclusive procedure or remedy . . . provided by a statute governing the agency” under MCL 24.264; and (3) whether it was necessary for the Court of Appeals to decide if the challenged permit conditions meet the definition of a “rule” under MCL 24.207 or of a “license” under MCL 24.205(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq., and if so, did it decide the question correctly.
165162
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Amy Lee Sheppard)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kalamazoo CC - Lightvoet, P.)
KARL DERELL BUTLER, (attorney Britt Cobb)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant and two other men are accused of sexually assaulting a female student at Western Michigan University when the men were also students. Three months before she was allegedly sexually assaulted by defendant and his codefendants, the complainant accused two other men of sexually assaulting her. The trial court ruled that the defendant could introduce evidence of the prior allegation. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in an unpublished opinion, holding that the defendant failed to present concrete evidence that the prior allegation was false. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) the appropriate standard for determining whether the defendant made a sufficient offer of proof to support holding an in camera evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the complainant’s alleged prior false accusation of nonconsensual sexual acts, see People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 350-352 (1984); see also People v Williams, 191 Mich App 269 (1991); (2) the defendant’s burden of proof in establishing the falsity of the complainant’s prior accusation against a different person that she was subjected to nonconsensual sexual acts, rendering the rape-shield statute inapplicable to evidence of the prior accusation, see Hackett, 421 Mich at 348; (3) whether barring evidence of the November 2008 sexual assault allegation in this case would constitute a denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation or the right to present a defense, see People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1 (1982); and (4) to what extent the Michigan Rules of Evidence apply when a trial court is determining what evidence of an alleged false allegation may be presented to the jury.
Thursday, January 11, 2024
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
165425
KAREN CARTER, (attorney Chelsea Lenard)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Stokes, W.)
DTN MANAGEMENT COMPANY, d/b/a DTN MGT, (attorney David Nelson)
Defendant-Appellant.
In January 2018, the plaintiff allegedly sustained an injury when she slipped on an icy sidewalk outside her apartment. In April 2021, she commenced a premises liability action against the defendant, who owns and operates the apartment complex. The defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff’s complaint was filed outside the applicable limitations period because it was filed more than three years after the injury. The plaintiff argued that her complaint was timely due to the Supreme Court’s Administrative Orders Nos. 2020-3 and 2020-18, which were issued in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court granted summary disposition in the defendant’s favor, concluding that Administrative Order 2020-3 applies only to limitations periods that would have expired during the State of the Emergency declared by the Governor. The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion, holding that the Supreme Court’s administrative orders merely modified the computation of time under MCR 1.108 in determining all filing deadlines. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court possessed the authority to issue Administrative Orders Nos. 2020-3 and 2020-18. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Armijo v Bronson Methodist Hosp (Docket No. 165399-400).
165399-165400
MARY ARMIJO, (attorney Mark Granzotto)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kalamazoo CC - Lipsey, A.)
BRONSON METHODIST HOSPITAL, BRIAN DYKSTRA, M.D., WILLIAM NICHOLS, JR., D.O., ASCENSION ALLEGAN HOSPITAL, and MARTIN FREEMAN, M.D., Defendants,
and
ANDREW FORSYTH, M.D., (attorney Michael Van Erp)
Defendant-Appellee.
—————
MARY ARMIJO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kalamazoo CC - Lipsey, A.)
BRONSON METHODIST HOSPITAL, BRIAN DYKSTRA, M.D., and WILLIAM NICHOLS, JR., M.D., (attorney John Cooper)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
ANDREW FORSYTH, M.D., ASCENSION ALLEGAN HOSPITAL, and MARTIN FREEMAN, M.D.,
Defendants.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants committed medical malpractice on March 6, 2018. She sent her notice of intent to sue on February 19, 2020, and filed her complaint on December 14, 2020. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed due to the Supreme Court’s Administrative Order 2020-3, which was issued in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion, holding that Administrative Order 2020-3 did not toll or otherwise stay the 182-day notice period and that the plaintiff’s complaint was not timely filed. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether under Administrative Order 2020-3 and Administrative Order 2020-18, the pre-suit notice period described in MCL 600.2912b continued to run from March 10, 2020 to June 20, 2020; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the plaintiff’s complaint was not timely filed. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Carter v DTN Mgmt Co. (Docket No. 165425)
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