The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in five cases on Wednesday, May 7, beginning at 9:30 a.m. in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa, Lansing. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, May 7
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
166182
CODY BONTER and KAYTLIN JACKMAN, (attorney Steven Hicks)
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-
Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Latchana, M.)
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Jeffrey Gerish)
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/
Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
TAYLON WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant.
On June 19, 2020, defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company issued a no-fault automobile insurance policy to Taylon Williams with effective dates from June 20, 2020, to December 20, 2020, and liability coverage of $20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident for his 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee.
On July 6, 2020, at Williams’ request, Progressive changed the insured vehicle from the Jeep to a 2017 Dodge Charger. Progressive sent Williams an “auto insurance coverage summary” reflecting this change. On July 22, 2020, Progressive sent Williams another insurance coverage summary reflecting that a credit union had been added as an interest-holder on the vehicle. On July 25, 2020, Williams, while driving the Charger, was involved in an accident in which plaintiffs Cody Bonter and Kaytlin Jackman were injured. The plaintiffs sued Williams for damages arising out of their injuries. After Progressive offered to settle the plaintiffs’ claims against Williams for the $20,000/$40,000 policy limits, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action to resolve whether Progressive was liable up to the $20,000/$40,000 limits or up to the new statutorily mandated $250,000/$500,000 limits that took effect after July 1, 2020, under MCL 500.3009(1). Progressive counterclaimed and moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to resolve that question. The trial court denied Progressive’s motion and granted summary disposition in favor of the plaintiffs under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter an order granting Progressive’s motion for summary disposition. After initially holding this case in abeyance for Progressive Marathon Ins Co v Pena, (Docket No. 165577), the Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether automobile policies delivered or issued for delivery prior to July 2, 2020, that insure against loss “resulting from liability imposed by law for property damage, bodily injury, or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle,” are subject to heightened liability coverage limits effective after July 1, 2020. See MCL 500.3009(1)(a), (b); and (2) whether the July 6, 2020 change in defendant Williams’ vehicles, coupled with defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company’s sending of the “auto insurance coverage summary” to Williams, constituted the delivery or issuance of an insurance policy that triggered the statutory conditions to impose the heightened liability coverage limits.
167153
MICHELLE DEMSKE, Individually and as Conservator for RD, PP, (attorney Keith Banka)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
SURGEONS CHOICE MEDICAL CENTER,
Intervening Plaintiff,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Ewell, E.)
MARTIN FICK and BEST ASPHALT, INC.,
Defendants,
and
STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Paul Hudson)
Defendant-Appellee.
MCL 500.3157, which is part of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., was amended, effective June 11, 2019, to add fee schedules for medical treatment rendered after July 1, 2021. The plaintiff and her husband were injured in a motor vehicle accident on October 25, 2019. They were insured by the defendant under a renewal policy effective October 1, 2019, to April 1, 2020. The plaintiff and her husband filed suit against the defendant asserting first-party no-fault claims for personal protection insurance benefits. The plaintiff was later appointed as her husband’s conservator. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the fee schedules in the amended version of MCL 500.3157(2) applied to medical treatment that was rendered to the plaintiff’s husband after July 1, 2021. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order granting the defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the fee schedules in MCL 500.3157(2) apply to medical treatment rendered after July 1, 2021, where the applicable renewal insurance policy took effect after the statutory amendment date of June 11, 2019, and the injured person was injured after that date, but before July 1, 2021. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Bonter v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (Docket No. 166182).
165666
In re CONTEMPT OF KATHY H. MURPHY.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Christopher Trebilcock)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(36th DC - Jones, K.; Wayne CC - Hood, N.)
KATHY H. MURPHY, (attorney Timothy Holloway)
Defendant-Appellant.
Attorney Kathy Murphy was representing a criminal defendant at his preliminary examination before District Judge Kenyetta Stanford Jones in 36th District Court when, during a recess and while the court was off the record, Murphy engaged in conduct the judge found to be contemptuous. The judge immediately held a summary proceeding and found Murphy criminally liable for contempt of court and ordered her to serve time in jail after the preliminary examination concluded. The judgment of contempt sentenced Murphy to two days in jail, which she served in the Wayne County jail. Murphy appealed to the circuit court. Wayne Circuit Judge Noah P. Hood reversed and vacated Murphy’s contempt conviction, concluding that the district judge abused her discretion by not specifying what happened while making her factual findings. But Judge Hood remanded the case to the district court for nonsummary contempt proceedings consistent with MCR 3.606. Murphy moved for reconsideration, arguing that further contempt proceedings on remand would violate her constitutional right against being held twice in jeopardy. Judge Hood denied the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether jeopardy attaches to summary contempt proceedings and if so, (2) whether the reversal of Murphy’s summary contempt conviction means double jeopardy would bar a remand for nonsummary contempt proceedings.
167208
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney JoEllen Haas)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ottawa CC - Miedema, K.)
DANTE ERIC WELLS, (attorney Garrett Burton)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, but the jury only convicted him of simple possession. The trial court sentenced the defendant at the top end of the guidelines minimum sentence range (46 months), stating that the sentence was based on the evidence presented to the jury at trial, including evidence that the defendant had digital scales, plastic baggies, and a large amount of cash in his possession. The trial court stated that this evidence showed an intent to distribute, but then immediately stated that the jury had convicted the defendant of possession and that he was being sentenced for that offense. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was sentenced in violation of People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019), in which the Court held that once a defendant is acquitted of a given crime, it violates due process to sentence him as if he committed that crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s sentence in an unpublished opinion, concluding that there was no evidence that the trial court considered acquitted conduct in determining the defendant’s sentence, given that the court explicitly stated that the possession conviction was the sole conviction for which defendant was being sentenced. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the jury acquitted the defendant of the principal charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine when it found him guilty of the lesser charge of simple possession; and (2) if so, whether the Ottawa Circuit Court violated People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019), in sentencing the defendant.
167745
In re BARBER/ESPINOZA, Minors.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Lenawee CC Family Division - Anzalone, A.)
Guardian Ad Litem for appellants minor children, Carson Howatt
Attorney for petitioner-appellee, Natassja Thomas
Attorney for respondent-appellee mother, Vivek Sankaran
Attorney for non-respondent father Nicole Underwood
The respondent is the mother of two minor children, a daughter, CB, and a son, ME. When CB was 13 years old, she reported that the respondent twice granted a male acquaintance permission to sexually assault her in exchange for drugs. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) removed the children on February 16, 2023, and petitioned the trial court to take jurisdiction and to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court placed the children with their father and ordered that reunification efforts need not be made before proceeding to termination. The trial court did not advise the respondent of her appellate rights at the conclusion of this hearing. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the respondent’s parental rights, concluding that statutory grounds to terminate were present by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion, concluding that: (1) there were not aggravated circumstances warranting the termination of the respondent’s parental rights without the DHHS first making reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (2) the respondent was prejudiced by the error; and (3) the trial court reversibly erred by not advising the respondent of her right to appeal following the preliminary hearing after removal of the children, where she could have raised a challenge to the failure to provide her with reunification services. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the respondent must be made where the respondent was not the perpetrator of criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, but instead facilitated, encouraged, or allowed such conduct by a third party in exchange for some benefit to the respondent, see MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), MCL 722.638(1) and (2); (2) if so, whether the lack of reasonable reunification efforts in this case was plain error affecting the respondent’s substantial rights, see generally In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29 (2019); (3) whether the Department of Health and Human Services satisfied the requirements of MCL 722.638(3); (4) if so, whether the termination of the respondent’s parental rights should be affirmed under that provision; and (5) whether the failure to advise the respondent of her right to appeal following the preliminary hearing was plain error affecting the respondent’s substantial rights, see MCR 3.965(B)(15).
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, May 7
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
166182
CODY BONTER and KAYTLIN JACKMAN, (attorney Steven Hicks)
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-
Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Latchana, M.)
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Jeffrey Gerish)
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/
Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
TAYLON WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant.
On June 19, 2020, defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company issued a no-fault automobile insurance policy to Taylon Williams with effective dates from June 20, 2020, to December 20, 2020, and liability coverage of $20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident for his 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee.
On July 6, 2020, at Williams’ request, Progressive changed the insured vehicle from the Jeep to a 2017 Dodge Charger. Progressive sent Williams an “auto insurance coverage summary” reflecting this change. On July 22, 2020, Progressive sent Williams another insurance coverage summary reflecting that a credit union had been added as an interest-holder on the vehicle. On July 25, 2020, Williams, while driving the Charger, was involved in an accident in which plaintiffs Cody Bonter and Kaytlin Jackman were injured. The plaintiffs sued Williams for damages arising out of their injuries. After Progressive offered to settle the plaintiffs’ claims against Williams for the $20,000/$40,000 policy limits, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action to resolve whether Progressive was liable up to the $20,000/$40,000 limits or up to the new statutorily mandated $250,000/$500,000 limits that took effect after July 1, 2020, under MCL 500.3009(1). Progressive counterclaimed and moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to resolve that question. The trial court denied Progressive’s motion and granted summary disposition in favor of the plaintiffs under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter an order granting Progressive’s motion for summary disposition. After initially holding this case in abeyance for Progressive Marathon Ins Co v Pena, (Docket No. 165577), the Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether automobile policies delivered or issued for delivery prior to July 2, 2020, that insure against loss “resulting from liability imposed by law for property damage, bodily injury, or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle,” are subject to heightened liability coverage limits effective after July 1, 2020. See MCL 500.3009(1)(a), (b); and (2) whether the July 6, 2020 change in defendant Williams’ vehicles, coupled with defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company’s sending of the “auto insurance coverage summary” to Williams, constituted the delivery or issuance of an insurance policy that triggered the statutory conditions to impose the heightened liability coverage limits.
167153
MICHELLE DEMSKE, Individually and as Conservator for RD, PP, (attorney Keith Banka)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
SURGEONS CHOICE MEDICAL CENTER,
Intervening Plaintiff,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Ewell, E.)
MARTIN FICK and BEST ASPHALT, INC.,
Defendants,
and
STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Paul Hudson)
Defendant-Appellee.
MCL 500.3157, which is part of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., was amended, effective June 11, 2019, to add fee schedules for medical treatment rendered after July 1, 2021. The plaintiff and her husband were injured in a motor vehicle accident on October 25, 2019. They were insured by the defendant under a renewal policy effective October 1, 2019, to April 1, 2020. The plaintiff and her husband filed suit against the defendant asserting first-party no-fault claims for personal protection insurance benefits. The plaintiff was later appointed as her husband’s conservator. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the fee schedules in the amended version of MCL 500.3157(2) applied to medical treatment that was rendered to the plaintiff’s husband after July 1, 2021. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order granting the defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the fee schedules in MCL 500.3157(2) apply to medical treatment rendered after July 1, 2021, where the applicable renewal insurance policy took effect after the statutory amendment date of June 11, 2019, and the injured person was injured after that date, but before July 1, 2021. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Bonter v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (Docket No. 166182).
165666
In re CONTEMPT OF KATHY H. MURPHY.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Christopher Trebilcock)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(36th DC - Jones, K.; Wayne CC - Hood, N.)
KATHY H. MURPHY, (attorney Timothy Holloway)
Defendant-Appellant.
Attorney Kathy Murphy was representing a criminal defendant at his preliminary examination before District Judge Kenyetta Stanford Jones in 36th District Court when, during a recess and while the court was off the record, Murphy engaged in conduct the judge found to be contemptuous. The judge immediately held a summary proceeding and found Murphy criminally liable for contempt of court and ordered her to serve time in jail after the preliminary examination concluded. The judgment of contempt sentenced Murphy to two days in jail, which she served in the Wayne County jail. Murphy appealed to the circuit court. Wayne Circuit Judge Noah P. Hood reversed and vacated Murphy’s contempt conviction, concluding that the district judge abused her discretion by not specifying what happened while making her factual findings. But Judge Hood remanded the case to the district court for nonsummary contempt proceedings consistent with MCR 3.606. Murphy moved for reconsideration, arguing that further contempt proceedings on remand would violate her constitutional right against being held twice in jeopardy. Judge Hood denied the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether jeopardy attaches to summary contempt proceedings and if so, (2) whether the reversal of Murphy’s summary contempt conviction means double jeopardy would bar a remand for nonsummary contempt proceedings.
167208
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney JoEllen Haas)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ottawa CC - Miedema, K.)
DANTE ERIC WELLS, (attorney Garrett Burton)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, but the jury only convicted him of simple possession. The trial court sentenced the defendant at the top end of the guidelines minimum sentence range (46 months), stating that the sentence was based on the evidence presented to the jury at trial, including evidence that the defendant had digital scales, plastic baggies, and a large amount of cash in his possession. The trial court stated that this evidence showed an intent to distribute, but then immediately stated that the jury had convicted the defendant of possession and that he was being sentenced for that offense. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was sentenced in violation of People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019), in which the Court held that once a defendant is acquitted of a given crime, it violates due process to sentence him as if he committed that crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s sentence in an unpublished opinion, concluding that there was no evidence that the trial court considered acquitted conduct in determining the defendant’s sentence, given that the court explicitly stated that the possession conviction was the sole conviction for which defendant was being sentenced. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the jury acquitted the defendant of the principal charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine when it found him guilty of the lesser charge of simple possession; and (2) if so, whether the Ottawa Circuit Court violated People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019), in sentencing the defendant.
167745
In re BARBER/ESPINOZA, Minors.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Lenawee CC Family Division - Anzalone, A.)
Guardian Ad Litem for appellants minor children, Carson Howatt
Attorney for petitioner-appellee, Natassja Thomas
Attorney for respondent-appellee mother, Vivek Sankaran
Attorney for non-respondent father Nicole Underwood
The respondent is the mother of two minor children, a daughter, CB, and a son, ME. When CB was 13 years old, she reported that the respondent twice granted a male acquaintance permission to sexually assault her in exchange for drugs. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) removed the children on February 16, 2023, and petitioned the trial court to take jurisdiction and to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court placed the children with their father and ordered that reunification efforts need not be made before proceeding to termination. The trial court did not advise the respondent of her appellate rights at the conclusion of this hearing. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the respondent’s parental rights, concluding that statutory grounds to terminate were present by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion, concluding that: (1) there were not aggravated circumstances warranting the termination of the respondent’s parental rights without the DHHS first making reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (2) the respondent was prejudiced by the error; and (3) the trial court reversibly erred by not advising the respondent of her right to appeal following the preliminary hearing after removal of the children, where she could have raised a challenge to the failure to provide her with reunification services. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the respondent must be made where the respondent was not the perpetrator of criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, but instead facilitated, encouraged, or allowed such conduct by a third party in exchange for some benefit to the respondent, see MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), MCL 722.638(1) and (2); (2) if so, whether the lack of reasonable reunification efforts in this case was plain error affecting the respondent’s substantial rights, see generally In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29 (2019); (3) whether the Department of Health and Human Services satisfied the requirements of MCL 722.638(3); (4) if so, whether the termination of the respondent’s parental rights should be affirmed under that provision; and (5) whether the failure to advise the respondent of her right to appeal following the preliminary hearing was plain error affecting the respondent’s substantial rights, see MCR 3.965(B)(15).
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