The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in seven cases on Wednesday and Thursday, November 5-6, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on both days. The cases will be heard in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing and will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, November 5
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
165961
ATTORNEY GENERAL, (attorney Darrin Fowler)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Stokes, W.)
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, (attorney John O'Quinn)
Defendant-Appellee.
The Attorney General seeks to investigate the cost of insulin medications manufactured by the defendant to determine whether the defendant’s pricing practices violate the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). To that end, the Attorney General petitioned the Ingham Circuit Court for the issuance of civil investigative subpoenas under MCL 445.907. The Attorney General also filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposed investigation of the defendant’s pricing practices is not barred by the MCPA’s exemption for “transaction[s] or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” MCL 445.904(1)(a). The complaint acknowledged that the Attorney General’s interpretation of the exemption is contrary to the construction given by the Supreme Court in Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446 (1999), and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203 (2007). The complaint alleged, however, that those cases were wrongly decided. The defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), arguing that its transactions and conduct fall within the MCPA’s exemption based on the Smith and Liss decisions. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the Attorney General’s complaint. The Attorney General claimed an appeal of right in the Court of Appeals and then filed a bypass application in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the bypass application but directed the Court of Appeals to expedite its consideration of the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in an unpublished opinion, holding that it was bound by Smith and Liss. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the plaintiff adequately pled a claim that the defendant violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq.; (2) whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to adequately plead a violation of the MCPA for a court to determine whether MCL 445.904(1)(a), an exemption to the MCPA, applies; (3) whether this Court’s decisions in Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446 (1999), and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203 (2007), correctly interpreted MCL 445.904(1)(a); and (4) if they were incorrectly decided, whether they should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468 (2000).
167262
NAKYRRA HOGAN, ANNETTE MARTIN, SHANNA KATRELL MCELROY, LISA MOORE, KRISTA ANSON, KRYSTLE ANN BEGLEY, RACHEL LYNN MILLER, NADAWA ALI, ARNEATA CHANTELL COBBS, JORDAN SEPULVEDA, and NICHOLE THOMAS, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, (attorney Michael Dezsi)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Hubbard, S.)
WAYNE COUNTY, WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF, and WAYNE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF, (attorney Mary Massaron)
Defendants-Appellees.
In 2020, the plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendants Wayne County, the Wayne County Sheriff, and the Wayne County Deputy Sheriff, alleging that they created a sexually hostile prison environment in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition (except with regard to plaintiff Chantell Cobbs), concluding that the plaintiffs (with the exception of Cobbs) were subject to the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq., and they failed to comply with those requirements. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the claims by the plaintiffs who were on probation or parole, and not physically incarcerated, at the time of the filing of the lawsuit because those plaintiffs were not “prisoners” for purposes of the PLRA. But the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of those plaintiffs who were incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the time the lawsuit was filed because those plaintiffs were “prisoners” for purposes of the PLRA. The court also affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because they failed to satisfy the requirements of commonality, typicality, and superiority. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether dismissal of a claim based on failure to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq., must be with prejudice, see MCL 600.5503(1); MCL 500.5507(2); MCL 600.5507(3)(b); and (2) whether plaintiff Krista Anson is a “prisoner” subject to the PLRA where she was not booked into Wayne County Jail until several hours after this lawsuit was filed. See MCL 600.5531(e).
167705-6
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Heather Bloomquist)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Muskegon CC - Smedley, A.)
KRISTOPHER HARLAN JOESEL, (attorney Charles Chamberlain)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was forcibly removed from a bar across the street from his apartment building. He later returned to the bar with a hunting knife and slashed the tires on several vehicles in the bar’s parking lot. The defendant returned to his apartment building, and was confronted in the foyer by Laura Sanchez, a patron of the bar. After exchanging words with the defendant, Sanchez pushed him into a bank of mailboxes. The defendant then stabbed her three times with the hunting knife. Sanchez died a short time later. The prosecution charged the defendant with open murder. At trial, the defendant argued that he acted in self-defense, but the jury convicted him of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to 33 to 90 years in prison and ordered him to pay restitution for Sanchez’s lost income. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying his request for a manslaughter instruction. He also challenged the restitution order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction and the restitution order in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Muskegon Circuit Court reversibly erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and (2) whether the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq., authorized the circuit court to order the defendant to pay restitution for the deceased victim’s future wage loss.
167608
NATIONWIDE AGRIBUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Wayne Roberts)
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tax Tribunal - Bieda, S.)
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, (attorney David Thompson)
Respondent-Appellant.
The petitioner is an insurance company that is part of a unitary business group (UBG) of insurance companies affiliated with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. These are all out-of-state insurance companies operating and paying taxes in Michigan. For the 2014 and 2015 tax years, the petitioner and each UBG member initially filed separate corporate income tax (CIT) returns in Michigan. But the petitioner later filed amended combined returns with the other UBG members in an attempt to aggregate their tax liability. Respondent Department of Treasury initially accepted the amended returns and issued refunds, but it later rejected them, ordered the return of those refunds, and imposed penalties. The petitioner filed an appeal with the Michigan Tax Tribunal to contest this effort. The question that the Tax Tribunal ultimately decided was whether the general provisions of the CIT Act control the ability of a UBG of insurance companies to file combined returns for premiums and retaliatory taxes or whether more specific provisions of the CIT Act preclude insurance companies from doing so. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held that the UBG could not file combined returns for premiums and retaliatory taxes. The Tax Tribunal issued a final order adopting the ALJ’s proposed opinion and judgment denying the petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and granting the respondent’s motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed the Tax Tribunal’s ruling and remanded the case to the Tax Tribunal for entry of summary disposition in favor of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals determined that the CIT Act’s definition of a UBG extends to insurance companies, thereby permitting the petitioner to file combined returns as a unitary group. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether Chapter 12 of the Income Tax Act of 1967, MCL 206.1 et seq., authorizes a unitary business group of insurance companies to file combined returns for collective premiums and retaliatory tax liabilities.
Thursday, November 6
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
167501-3
In re ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER.
SHELLIE SPACIL, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER, (attorney David Heyboer)
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(St Clair PC - Tomlinson, J.)
JULIE BROOKS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF HELEN FOWLER, (attorney John McNamee)
Appellee.
—————
In re ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER.
SHELLIE SPACIL, Trustee for the JENNIFER L. FOWLER TRUST,
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(St Clair PC - Tomlinson, J.)
JULIE BROOKS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF HELEN FOWLER,
Appellee.
—————
In re ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER.
SHELLIE SPACIL, Trustee for the JENNIFER L. FOWLER TRUST,
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(St Clair PC - Tomlinson, J.)
JULIE BROOKS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF HELEN FOWLER,
Appellee.
After Jennifer Fowler fatally shot her mother, Helen Fowler, and then committed suicide, Helen Fowler’s estate filed a wrongful death claim and obtained a judgment of $623,606.24 against Jennifer Fowler’s estate. The trustee of Jennifer Fowler’s trust filed a declaratory judgment action to determine what assets of the trust could be used to satisfy the judgment. At issue is Jennifer Fowler’s 401(k) retirement plan, which named her trust as the beneficiary, and a life insurance policy, which named the trust as the beneficiary. The probate court held that the 401(k) account funds were exempt under MCL 700.7605(2), but that the life insurance proceeds could be used to satisfy the judgment. Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and issued a published opinion, reversing the part of the probate court’s order disallowing recovery of the 401(k) account proceeds, and affirming the part allowing the life insurance proceeds to be used to satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the 401(k) account funds at issue are exempt from attachment by the Estate of Helen Fowler (Helen’s Estate); and (2) whether the life insurance proceeds at issue are subject to the claims by Helen’s Estate to the extent that the Estate of Jennifer L. Fowler lacks sufficient assets to satisfy the claims.
167760
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Jerrold Schrotenboer)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Jordon, D)
EVAN TAYLOR ARMOGEDA, (attorney Christopher Wickman)
Defendant-Appellant.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder (AWIM), carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, and third-degree fleeing and eluding. The trial court sentenced him to 30 to 50 years for AWIM and lesser sentences for the other offenses. The defendant filed a post-conviction motion in the trial court to correct his sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously scored Prior Record Variable (PRV) 2 and Offense Variable (OV) 12. According to the defendant, no points should have been assessed for PRV 2 and OV 12. The prosecution conceded that ten points should not have been assessed for OV 12, but the reduction of those points from the offense variable score would not change the guidelines minimum sentence range. The prosecution also conceded that 30 points should not have been assessed for PRV 2, but argued that 20 points should have been scored for that variable. Despite the prosecution’s concessions, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to correct the AWIM sentence without correcting the scores for PRV 2 and OV 12 and without ordering resentencing. The trial court acknowledged that some reduction of the guidelines range was in order, but did not determine the appropriate range because he would have imposed the same 30-year minimum sentence for AWIM regardless of the appropriate range. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing to clarify the correct assessment of PRV 2, adjust the guidelines range to consider the correct scoring of PRV 2 and OV 12, and correct the Presentence Investigation Report to reflect these determinations. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether resentencing is required where the trial court has clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the scoring error, but the sentence does not fall within the appropriate guidelines range as amended. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8 (2006); see also People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015).
167593
KNIER, POWERS, MARTIN, & SMITH, LLC, (attorney David Powers)
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tax Tribunal - Halm, P.)
CITY OF BAY CITY, (attorney Thomas Amon)
Respondent-Appellee.
The petitioner hired a contractor to replace the roof on its commercial office building. The respondent sent the petitioner notice that it assessed an increase in the taxable value of the property due to the installation of the new roof, which increased the value by approximately 12%. While increases in taxable value are generally limited to a cap of the lesser of 5% or the inflation rate, the respondent determined additional taxation was permitted because the increased value arose from an “addition” under Const 1963, art 9, § 3 and MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(iii). The petitioner contested the assessment of the property with the Bay City Board of Review, which affirmed the assessment. The Michigan Tax Tribunal issued a final opinion and judgment denying the petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and granting partial summary disposition to the respondent, concluding that the roof replacement was “new construction” under MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(iii) and therefore an “addition” under MCL 211.27a(2)(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Tribunal in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the installation of a new roof on the petitioner’s commercial property constituted an “addition[]” within the meaning of art 9, § 3 of the Michigan Constitution and MCL 211.34d(1)(b).
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, November 5
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
165961
ATTORNEY GENERAL, (attorney Darrin Fowler)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Stokes, W.)
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, (attorney John O'Quinn)
Defendant-Appellee.
The Attorney General seeks to investigate the cost of insulin medications manufactured by the defendant to determine whether the defendant’s pricing practices violate the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). To that end, the Attorney General petitioned the Ingham Circuit Court for the issuance of civil investigative subpoenas under MCL 445.907. The Attorney General also filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposed investigation of the defendant’s pricing practices is not barred by the MCPA’s exemption for “transaction[s] or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” MCL 445.904(1)(a). The complaint acknowledged that the Attorney General’s interpretation of the exemption is contrary to the construction given by the Supreme Court in Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446 (1999), and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203 (2007). The complaint alleged, however, that those cases were wrongly decided. The defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), arguing that its transactions and conduct fall within the MCPA’s exemption based on the Smith and Liss decisions. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the Attorney General’s complaint. The Attorney General claimed an appeal of right in the Court of Appeals and then filed a bypass application in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the bypass application but directed the Court of Appeals to expedite its consideration of the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in an unpublished opinion, holding that it was bound by Smith and Liss. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the plaintiff adequately pled a claim that the defendant violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq.; (2) whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to adequately plead a violation of the MCPA for a court to determine whether MCL 445.904(1)(a), an exemption to the MCPA, applies; (3) whether this Court’s decisions in Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446 (1999), and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203 (2007), correctly interpreted MCL 445.904(1)(a); and (4) if they were incorrectly decided, whether they should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468 (2000).
167262
NAKYRRA HOGAN, ANNETTE MARTIN, SHANNA KATRELL MCELROY, LISA MOORE, KRISTA ANSON, KRYSTLE ANN BEGLEY, RACHEL LYNN MILLER, NADAWA ALI, ARNEATA CHANTELL COBBS, JORDAN SEPULVEDA, and NICHOLE THOMAS, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, (attorney Michael Dezsi)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Hubbard, S.)
WAYNE COUNTY, WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF, and WAYNE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF, (attorney Mary Massaron)
Defendants-Appellees.
In 2020, the plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendants Wayne County, the Wayne County Sheriff, and the Wayne County Deputy Sheriff, alleging that they created a sexually hostile prison environment in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition (except with regard to plaintiff Chantell Cobbs), concluding that the plaintiffs (with the exception of Cobbs) were subject to the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq., and they failed to comply with those requirements. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the claims by the plaintiffs who were on probation or parole, and not physically incarcerated, at the time of the filing of the lawsuit because those plaintiffs were not “prisoners” for purposes of the PLRA. But the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of those plaintiffs who were incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the time the lawsuit was filed because those plaintiffs were “prisoners” for purposes of the PLRA. The court also affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because they failed to satisfy the requirements of commonality, typicality, and superiority. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether dismissal of a claim based on failure to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq., must be with prejudice, see MCL 600.5503(1); MCL 500.5507(2); MCL 600.5507(3)(b); and (2) whether plaintiff Krista Anson is a “prisoner” subject to the PLRA where she was not booked into Wayne County Jail until several hours after this lawsuit was filed. See MCL 600.5531(e).
167705-6
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Heather Bloomquist)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Muskegon CC - Smedley, A.)
KRISTOPHER HARLAN JOESEL, (attorney Charles Chamberlain)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was forcibly removed from a bar across the street from his apartment building. He later returned to the bar with a hunting knife and slashed the tires on several vehicles in the bar’s parking lot. The defendant returned to his apartment building, and was confronted in the foyer by Laura Sanchez, a patron of the bar. After exchanging words with the defendant, Sanchez pushed him into a bank of mailboxes. The defendant then stabbed her three times with the hunting knife. Sanchez died a short time later. The prosecution charged the defendant with open murder. At trial, the defendant argued that he acted in self-defense, but the jury convicted him of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to 33 to 90 years in prison and ordered him to pay restitution for Sanchez’s lost income. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying his request for a manslaughter instruction. He also challenged the restitution order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction and the restitution order in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Muskegon Circuit Court reversibly erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and (2) whether the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq., authorized the circuit court to order the defendant to pay restitution for the deceased victim’s future wage loss.
167608
NATIONWIDE AGRIBUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Wayne Roberts)
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tax Tribunal - Bieda, S.)
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, (attorney David Thompson)
Respondent-Appellant.
The petitioner is an insurance company that is part of a unitary business group (UBG) of insurance companies affiliated with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. These are all out-of-state insurance companies operating and paying taxes in Michigan. For the 2014 and 2015 tax years, the petitioner and each UBG member initially filed separate corporate income tax (CIT) returns in Michigan. But the petitioner later filed amended combined returns with the other UBG members in an attempt to aggregate their tax liability. Respondent Department of Treasury initially accepted the amended returns and issued refunds, but it later rejected them, ordered the return of those refunds, and imposed penalties. The petitioner filed an appeal with the Michigan Tax Tribunal to contest this effort. The question that the Tax Tribunal ultimately decided was whether the general provisions of the CIT Act control the ability of a UBG of insurance companies to file combined returns for premiums and retaliatory taxes or whether more specific provisions of the CIT Act preclude insurance companies from doing so. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held that the UBG could not file combined returns for premiums and retaliatory taxes. The Tax Tribunal issued a final order adopting the ALJ’s proposed opinion and judgment denying the petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and granting the respondent’s motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed the Tax Tribunal’s ruling and remanded the case to the Tax Tribunal for entry of summary disposition in favor of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals determined that the CIT Act’s definition of a UBG extends to insurance companies, thereby permitting the petitioner to file combined returns as a unitary group. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether Chapter 12 of the Income Tax Act of 1967, MCL 206.1 et seq., authorizes a unitary business group of insurance companies to file combined returns for collective premiums and retaliatory tax liabilities.
Thursday, November 6
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
167501-3
In re ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER.
SHELLIE SPACIL, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER, (attorney David Heyboer)
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(St Clair PC - Tomlinson, J.)
JULIE BROOKS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF HELEN FOWLER, (attorney John McNamee)
Appellee.
—————
In re ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER.
SHELLIE SPACIL, Trustee for the JENNIFER L. FOWLER TRUST,
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(St Clair PC - Tomlinson, J.)
JULIE BROOKS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF HELEN FOWLER,
Appellee.
—————
In re ESTATE OF JENNIFER L. FOWLER.
SHELLIE SPACIL, Trustee for the JENNIFER L. FOWLER TRUST,
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(St Clair PC - Tomlinson, J.)
JULIE BROOKS, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF HELEN FOWLER,
Appellee.
After Jennifer Fowler fatally shot her mother, Helen Fowler, and then committed suicide, Helen Fowler’s estate filed a wrongful death claim and obtained a judgment of $623,606.24 against Jennifer Fowler’s estate. The trustee of Jennifer Fowler’s trust filed a declaratory judgment action to determine what assets of the trust could be used to satisfy the judgment. At issue is Jennifer Fowler’s 401(k) retirement plan, which named her trust as the beneficiary, and a life insurance policy, which named the trust as the beneficiary. The probate court held that the 401(k) account funds were exempt under MCL 700.7605(2), but that the life insurance proceeds could be used to satisfy the judgment. Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and issued a published opinion, reversing the part of the probate court’s order disallowing recovery of the 401(k) account proceeds, and affirming the part allowing the life insurance proceeds to be used to satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the 401(k) account funds at issue are exempt from attachment by the Estate of Helen Fowler (Helen’s Estate); and (2) whether the life insurance proceeds at issue are subject to the claims by Helen’s Estate to the extent that the Estate of Jennifer L. Fowler lacks sufficient assets to satisfy the claims.
167760
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Jerrold Schrotenboer)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Jordon, D)
EVAN TAYLOR ARMOGEDA, (attorney Christopher Wickman)
Defendant-Appellant.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder (AWIM), carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, and third-degree fleeing and eluding. The trial court sentenced him to 30 to 50 years for AWIM and lesser sentences for the other offenses. The defendant filed a post-conviction motion in the trial court to correct his sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously scored Prior Record Variable (PRV) 2 and Offense Variable (OV) 12. According to the defendant, no points should have been assessed for PRV 2 and OV 12. The prosecution conceded that ten points should not have been assessed for OV 12, but the reduction of those points from the offense variable score would not change the guidelines minimum sentence range. The prosecution also conceded that 30 points should not have been assessed for PRV 2, but argued that 20 points should have been scored for that variable. Despite the prosecution’s concessions, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to correct the AWIM sentence without correcting the scores for PRV 2 and OV 12 and without ordering resentencing. The trial court acknowledged that some reduction of the guidelines range was in order, but did not determine the appropriate range because he would have imposed the same 30-year minimum sentence for AWIM regardless of the appropriate range. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing to clarify the correct assessment of PRV 2, adjust the guidelines range to consider the correct scoring of PRV 2 and OV 12, and correct the Presentence Investigation Report to reflect these determinations. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether resentencing is required where the trial court has clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the scoring error, but the sentence does not fall within the appropriate guidelines range as amended. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8 (2006); see also People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015).
167593
KNIER, POWERS, MARTIN, & SMITH, LLC, (attorney David Powers)
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tax Tribunal - Halm, P.)
CITY OF BAY CITY, (attorney Thomas Amon)
Respondent-Appellee.
The petitioner hired a contractor to replace the roof on its commercial office building. The respondent sent the petitioner notice that it assessed an increase in the taxable value of the property due to the installation of the new roof, which increased the value by approximately 12%. While increases in taxable value are generally limited to a cap of the lesser of 5% or the inflation rate, the respondent determined additional taxation was permitted because the increased value arose from an “addition” under Const 1963, art 9, § 3 and MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(iii). The petitioner contested the assessment of the property with the Bay City Board of Review, which affirmed the assessment. The Michigan Tax Tribunal issued a final opinion and judgment denying the petitioner’s motion for summary disposition and granting partial summary disposition to the respondent, concluding that the roof replacement was “new construction” under MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(iii) and therefore an “addition” under MCL 211.27a(2)(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Tribunal in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the installation of a new roof on the petitioner’s commercial property constituted an “addition[]” within the meaning of art 9, § 3 of the Michigan Constitution and MCL 211.34d(1)(b).
––––––––––––––––––––
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