Erica L. Quigley and Adam M. Taub
The U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025) not only resolved a longstanding circuit split over the evidentiary burden for majority-group plaintiffs under Title VII, but also signaled a broader shift in how courts may approach employment discrimination claims going forward.
The Court held that members of a “majority group”— i.e., those belonging to groups that have not historically faced discrimination — no longer have a heightened evidentiary burden compared to minority groups: they need not prove “background circumstances” to support that the employer unusually discriminated against the majority.
The plaintiff (who is heterosexual) alleged that her employer violated Title VII when it denied her a promotion in favor of a homosexual female, then demoted her and replaced her in her prior position with a homosexual male. She claimed that her employer denied her the promotion and demoted her because of her heterosexual sexual orientation. While these facts would ordinarily satisfy her burden under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, under Sixth Circuit precedent, as a member of a majority group, she was required to provide additional evidence, such as statistical proof or information about the relevant decisionmaker’s protected traits. She failed to produce such evidence, leading to dismissal of the case on summary judgment.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s opinion emphasized that Title VII protects “any individual” from discrimination based on protected characteristics, regardless of whether the person belongs to a majority or minority group. The Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule, which had required majority-group plaintiffs to provide additional proof—such as statistical evidence or information about the protected traits the decisionmaker may have—to establish a prima facie case. The Court found this rule to be inconsistent with both the text of Title VII and its own precedent, which discourages rigid applications of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
This ruling effectively levels the playing field for all plaintiffs, removing a procedural barrier that affected only majority-group litigants. As a result, courts must now evaluate claims of discrimination based solely on whether the plaintiff can show that they suffered an adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic—without regard to group membership. This change may lead to an increase in majority-group litigants bringing claims previously characterized as reverse discrimination. It is now much easier for these litigants to meet their prima facie burden, which will likely allow numerous plaintiffs to proceed to trial who would previously have had their cases dismissed on summary judgment.
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, went further. In his concurrence, he argued that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework itself lacks textual support in Title VII and should be reconsidered in a future case. He criticized the framework form creating unnecessary complexity and for fostering inconsistent standards between cases involving direct and circumstantial evidence.
Justice Thomas’s critique is not new—he has long expressed skepticism about judge-made doctrines that stray from statutory text. But in Ames, his argument gained new traction. He noted that Title VII’s plain language requires courts to determine whether there is evidence of intentional discrimination, and that the burden-shifting approach may obscure that inquiry rather than clarify it.
If the Court were to adopt Justice Thomas’s view and eliminate the McDonnell Douglas framework, the implications would be profound:
• Simplified litigation: Plaintiffs would no longer need to navigate the three-step burden-shifting process. Instead, courts would focus directly on whether the evidence supports a finding of intentional discrimination.
• Increased judicial discretion: Without a structured framework, judges may have more latitude in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, leading to less predictable outcomes.
• Impact on DEI programs: Justice Thomas’s concurrence may invite increased scrutiny of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Programs that appear to favor minority groups could be challenged under the now-equal evidentiary standard for majority-group plaintiffs.
• Shift in summary judgment practice: The McDonnell Douglas framework has long served as a gatekeeping tool at the summary judgment stage. Its removal could result in more cases proceeding to trial, increasing litigation costs and risks for employers.
Courts analyze employment discrimination claims under the Supreme Court’s framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in which the plaintiff is required to make an initial showing of discriminatory intent, after which the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason is a “pretext,” or cover, for discrimination.
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Erica L. Quigley is an associate at Miller Johnson in the Employment and Labor practice group, focusing on management-side labor and employment counseling and litigation, as well as governmental legal matters. Adam M. Taub is a founding partner at Croson, Taub, & Michaels, PLLC where he specializes in all forms of workplace disputes, including wrongful termination, discrimination, harassment, whistleblower, non-compete, and wage and hour issues. This column is reprinted with permission from the Washtenaw County Bar Association newsletter Res Ipsa Loquitur.
The Court held that members of a “majority group”— i.e., those belonging to groups that have not historically faced discrimination — no longer have a heightened evidentiary burden compared to minority groups: they need not prove “background circumstances” to support that the employer unusually discriminated against the majority.
The plaintiff (who is heterosexual) alleged that her employer violated Title VII when it denied her a promotion in favor of a homosexual female, then demoted her and replaced her in her prior position with a homosexual male. She claimed that her employer denied her the promotion and demoted her because of her heterosexual sexual orientation. While these facts would ordinarily satisfy her burden under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, under Sixth Circuit precedent, as a member of a majority group, she was required to provide additional evidence, such as statistical proof or information about the relevant decisionmaker’s protected traits. She failed to produce such evidence, leading to dismissal of the case on summary judgment.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s opinion emphasized that Title VII protects “any individual” from discrimination based on protected characteristics, regardless of whether the person belongs to a majority or minority group. The Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule, which had required majority-group plaintiffs to provide additional proof—such as statistical evidence or information about the protected traits the decisionmaker may have—to establish a prima facie case. The Court found this rule to be inconsistent with both the text of Title VII and its own precedent, which discourages rigid applications of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
This ruling effectively levels the playing field for all plaintiffs, removing a procedural barrier that affected only majority-group litigants. As a result, courts must now evaluate claims of discrimination based solely on whether the plaintiff can show that they suffered an adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic—without regard to group membership. This change may lead to an increase in majority-group litigants bringing claims previously characterized as reverse discrimination. It is now much easier for these litigants to meet their prima facie burden, which will likely allow numerous plaintiffs to proceed to trial who would previously have had their cases dismissed on summary judgment.
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, went further. In his concurrence, he argued that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework itself lacks textual support in Title VII and should be reconsidered in a future case. He criticized the framework form creating unnecessary complexity and for fostering inconsistent standards between cases involving direct and circumstantial evidence.
Justice Thomas’s critique is not new—he has long expressed skepticism about judge-made doctrines that stray from statutory text. But in Ames, his argument gained new traction. He noted that Title VII’s plain language requires courts to determine whether there is evidence of intentional discrimination, and that the burden-shifting approach may obscure that inquiry rather than clarify it.
If the Court were to adopt Justice Thomas’s view and eliminate the McDonnell Douglas framework, the implications would be profound:
• Simplified litigation: Plaintiffs would no longer need to navigate the three-step burden-shifting process. Instead, courts would focus directly on whether the evidence supports a finding of intentional discrimination.
• Increased judicial discretion: Without a structured framework, judges may have more latitude in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, leading to less predictable outcomes.
• Impact on DEI programs: Justice Thomas’s concurrence may invite increased scrutiny of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Programs that appear to favor minority groups could be challenged under the now-equal evidentiary standard for majority-group plaintiffs.
• Shift in summary judgment practice: The McDonnell Douglas framework has long served as a gatekeeping tool at the summary judgment stage. Its removal could result in more cases proceeding to trial, increasing litigation costs and risks for employers.
Courts analyze employment discrimination claims under the Supreme Court’s framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in which the plaintiff is required to make an initial showing of discriminatory intent, after which the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason is a “pretext,” or cover, for discrimination.
—————
Erica L. Quigley is an associate at Miller Johnson in the Employment and Labor practice group, focusing on management-side labor and employment counseling and litigation, as well as governmental legal matters. Adam M. Taub is a founding partner at Croson, Taub, & Michaels, PLLC where he specializes in all forms of workplace disputes, including wrongful termination, discrimination, harassment, whistleblower, non-compete, and wage and hour issues. This column is reprinted with permission from the Washtenaw County Bar Association newsletter Res Ipsa Loquitur.
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