The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in eight cases on Wednesday and Thursday, April 8-9, beginning at 9:30 a.m., each day. The cases will be heard in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing and will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys
Wednesday, April 8
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
168205
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Timothy A. Baughman)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Slavens, M.)
JAMES GREGORY EADS, (attorney Gabi D. Silver)
Defendant-Appellee.
Following a jury trial in 1992, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and felony-firearm for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. The trial court sentenced him as an adult and, departing upward from the sentencing guidelines, imposed consecutive sentences of 50 to 75 years in prison for second-degree murder and two years for felony-firearm. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, and the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. In 2021, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, challenging the constitutionality of his sentence for second-degree murder. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals issued a published opinion, holding that the defendant’s term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder exceeded the constitutional standard for cruel or unusual punishment under People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022), and that the trial court did not consider the defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor as required by People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022). The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that: (1) the defendant is entitled to relief under People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022); and (2) the defendant is entitled to relief under People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022).
168159
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Marilyn J. Day
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Matthews, C.)
DONYELLE MICHAEL BLACK, (attorney Deborah A. LaBelle)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant is serving a prison sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a rape and murder in 1987 when he was 15 years old. In Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory LWOP for a defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time of the sentencing offense violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In September 2021, the trial court held a sentencing hearing pursuant to Miller, at which the defendant offered expert testimony from a forensic psychologist, who opined that the defendant had demonstrated a capacity for rehabilitation. The trial court nevertheless reimposed a sentence of LWOP. While the defendant’s appeal of that sentence was pending in the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 138-139 (2022), which placed the burden on the prosecution to rebut a presumption that a juvenile defendant is not deserving of LWOP by clear and convincing evidence. On the parties’ stipulation, the Court of Appeals vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for a new Miller hearing to be conducted in conformity with Taylor. On remand, the prosecution moved to either compel the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by an expert of its own choosing or strike the defense expert’s testimony and written report from the record. The defendant responded that compelling him to participate in such an examination would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion and gave the defendant four weeks to either submit to an examination by the prosecution’s expert or stipulate to striking the evidence supplied by the defense expert. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in a published opinion, holding that when a defendant intends to submit an expert witness and report to the trial court that addresses any relevant Miller factor, neither the Fifth Amendment nor Const 1963, art 1, § 17 prohibits the trial court from requiring the defendant to submit to an examination by a state expert. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the constitutional bar on compelled self-incrimination precludes a sentencing court from requiring the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by the prosecution’s expert as a precondition to admitting testimony from the defendant’s psychological expert at a resentencing hearing conducted pursuant to MCL 769.25a and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), see US Const, Ams V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; (2) if not, whether the sentencing court may require the defendant to make his or her decision on whether to submit to a compelled psychological examination before the prosecution has rested its case in chief; and (3) whether the results of a compelled psychological examination are admissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief or solely as rebuttal evidence.
168680
FCA US LLC, (attorney Cynthia M. Filipovich)
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Valentine, V.)
KAMAX INC, (attorney Jason D. Killips)
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellant,
and
KAMAX MEXICO S DE RL DE CV,
Defendant.
FCA US, LLC manufactures motor vehicles and Kamax, Inc. supplies parts to FCA. The primary issue in this case is whether the contract between the parties, which permits FCA to purchase approximately 65%-100% of its requirements from Kamax, is a “release-by-release” contract or a “requirements” contract containing a sufficiently specific quantity term to satisfy the statute of frauds codified in the Uniform Commercial Code at MCL 440.2201(1). Kamax claims that under the decision in MSSC, Inc v Airboss Flexible Prods Co, 511 Mich 176 (2023), the contract is a release-by-release contract, and Kamax stopped deliveries to FCA in February 2024. FCA sued Kamax for specific performance, breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and an injunction. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction compelling Kamax to continue delivering parts to FCA. Kamax filed counterclaims for unjust enrichment and conversion and moved for summary disposition and to dissolve the injunction. The trial court denied the motion for summary disposition and declined to dissolve the injunction, thus requiring Kamax to continue delivering parts to FCA. The trial court concluded that the contract was an enforceable requirements contract under the reasoning in Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc v Tubular Metal Sys, LLC, 331 Mich App 416 (2020). Kamax filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals and a bypass application in the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court denied the bypass application and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, Kamax filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc v Tubular Metal Sys, LLC, 331 Mich App 416 (2020), remains good law after the Court’s decision in MSSC, Inc v Airboss Flexible Prods Co, 511 Mich 176 (2023); and (2) whether a written contract for approximately 65-100% of a buyer’s requirements satisfies the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code’s statute of frauds, MCL 440.2201(1).
Wednesday, April 8
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
167532-3
MOHAMMED ABDULLA, (attorney Steven Hicks)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
PRECISE MRI OF MICHIGAN, LLC,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Hathaway, D.)
PROGRESSIVE SOUTHEASTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, and MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN,
Defendants,
and
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Mary Massaron)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY, (attorney Katharine Gostek)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff is a commercial truck driver who was injured while operating a tractor-trailer that collided with another tractor-trailer in Missouri. He was living with his parents in Michigan at the time of the accident. The plaintiff is seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the Michigan no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. The tractor was registered in Michigan and titled to Tornado Trucking, LLC, a limited-liability company solely owned by the plaintiff. The trailer was titled to Land Trucking, LLC. Pursuant to a lease agreement, Land Trucking leased Tornado Trucking’s tractor and Tornado Trucking transported cargo for Land Trucking. The plaintiff was the only person who drove the tractor. If the plaintiff is deemed to be an owner of the tractor within the meaning of MCL 500.3101(3), he would not be entitled to PIP benefits because he did not maintain the required insurance on the tractor. The trial court held that the plaintiff was not an owner of the tractor and further held that he is entitled to PIP benefits from Auto Club Group Insurance Company, which provided his father with a no-fault insurance policy that included PIP coverage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the plaintiff was an “owner” of the motor vehicle at issue within the meaning of MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i), see Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich 524, 530-532 (2004); and (2) whether the plaintiff is entitled to personal protection insurance benefits as a relative of the named insured domiciled in the same household, see MCL 500.3111, MCL 500.3114.
168010-1
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Nicholas Johnson)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Emmet CC - Deegan, J.)
RICHARD EDWARD KLUNGLE, (attorney Michael Waldo)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant lived in his grandmother’s home for approximately five years before she died without a will. The home passed to her children, who wanted to sell it. The defendant refused to leave, so his uncle had him evicted. Police officers came to enforce the eviction, but the defendant resisted. The officers had to drag the defendant out of the home, culminating in his arrest. During booking, the defendant told the officers they needed to be shot in the face. The prosecution charged the defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender with two counts of resisting and obstructing a police officer and one count of trespass. At trial, during closing arguments, defense counsel effectively conceded the defendant’s guilt to the trespassing charge. The defendant was convicted of all three offenses and was sentenced to 2 to 15 years in prison for each resisting and obstructing conviction and a 90-day jail term for trespassing. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether trial counsel’s concession of the defendant’s guilt to trespassing deprived the defendant of his right to counsel and of the autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert his innocence. See McCoy v Louisiana, 584 US 414, 417 (2018); Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175 (2004).
Thursday, April 9
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
168009
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Daniel Hebel)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Bazzi, M.)
GWENDOLYN JOSEPHINE ALEXANDER, (attorney Michael Mittlestat
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was criminally charged with child abuse and torture as a result of allegations following a welfare check that she physically disciplined her six-year-old son by binding his wrists and ankles using zip ties in order to control the child’s alleged misbehavior. Dr. Dena Nazer, medical director of Kids-TALK Children’s Advocacy Center at Wayne State University, testified at trial that she diagnosed the child as suffering from medical torture. A Wayne County jury convicted the defendant of torture, second-degree child abuse, second-degree child abuse in the presence of another child, and third-degree child abuse. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 17 to 30 years in prison for the torture conviction and lesser sentences for the other convictions. The defendant argued on appeal, among other things, that Dr. Nazer’s diagnosis that the child suffered from medical torture invaded the province of the jury. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but vacated her sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing due to errors in scoring the offense variables. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the prosecution’s medical expert invaded the province of the jury by using the phrase “medical torture” to label her diagnosis of the child complainant.
168356
McKENNA FROWNFELTER, (attorney Phillip Serafini
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Rowe, K.)
ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Aaron W. Hinman)
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellee,
and
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY, FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, (atrorney Christopher P. Endres)
Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.
—————
168357
McKENNA FROWNFELTER, (attorney Phillip Serafini
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Rowe, K.)
COREY FROWNFELTER, AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorneys Christopher P. Endres, Aaron W. Hinman)
Defendants-Appellees.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident when she was 15 years old while a passenger in a car driven by her brother and owned by her father, Corey Frownfelter, who was insured under policies issued by Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, and Farmers Insurance Company. The plaintiff had spent the previous night at her father’s house. Her parents had a custody order that provided for joint physical custody, but the plaintiff lived with her mother (Stephanie Lawrence) approximately 75% of the time and her father the other 25%. Lawrence was insured by Auto-Owners Insurance Company. A dispute arose over which insurer was highest in priority to pay no-fault benefits, with plaintiff filing suit against Esurance and Esurance filing a third-party complaint against Progressive, Farmers, and Auto-Owners. Esurance moved for summary disposition of the plaintiff’s case, arguing that she was domiciled with her mother as a matter of law at the time of the accident, making Auto-Owners the highest priority insurer pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1). The trial court denied Esurance’s motion and granted Auto-Owners’ request for judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). The plaintiff also filed an action against her father and his insurers, seeking non-economic damages under MCL 500.3135 for injuries sustained in the accident. The parties disputed whether a “step-down” provision in the Esurance policy applied, which would lower bodily injury liability coverage from $250,000 to $20,000. The plaintiff moved for summary disposition on that issue, arguing that the provision did not apply and Esurance was liable for the full $250,000 because she was not a “resident” of her father’s home at the time of the accident. The trial court denied that motion. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed each of the trial court’s rulings in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the lower courts erred in concluding that: (1) the appellant was domiciled with her father, Corey Frownfelter, at the time of the January 8, 2020 motor vehicle accident, see Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 512 n 78 (2013); but see id. at 516-519 (Zahra, J., concurring); and (2) the appellant was a resident of Frownfelter’s household at the time of the accident.
168462
KERAN ERNEST, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF MAURICE ERNEST, (attorney Paul Matouka)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Bell, C.)
PAUL W. BROWN, JR., M.D., ELMAHDI M. SAEED, CYPRESS CARDIOLOGY, PLLC, and McLAREN HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, (attorney Timothy A. Diemer)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DR. FAROUK M. BELAL,
Defendant.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants committed medical malpractice on July 16, 2020. The complaint was filed on August 14, 2023, outside the two-year limitations period. But the plaintiff asserts that her complaint was timely because the wrongful-death savings provision, MCL 600.5852, permits a personal representative to file suit within two years of the date the letters of authority were issued and because she is entitled to 182 days of tolling under MCL 600.2912b, which provides for tolling when a notice of intent to sue (NOI) is sent to a defendant. The defendants moved for summary disposition on the basis of Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004), in which the Court held that sending an NOI does not toll the wrongful-death savings period. The trial court followed Waltz and granted the motions for summary disposition. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals and filed a bypass application in the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court denied the bypass application, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004), correctly held that MCL 600.5856(c) does not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions provided in MCL 600.5852; and (2) if Waltz was incorrectly decided, whether it should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468 (2000).
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys
Wednesday, April 8
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
168205
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Timothy A. Baughman)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Slavens, M.)
JAMES GREGORY EADS, (attorney Gabi D. Silver)
Defendant-Appellee.
Following a jury trial in 1992, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and felony-firearm for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. The trial court sentenced him as an adult and, departing upward from the sentencing guidelines, imposed consecutive sentences of 50 to 75 years in prison for second-degree murder and two years for felony-firearm. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, and the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. In 2021, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, challenging the constitutionality of his sentence for second-degree murder. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals issued a published opinion, holding that the defendant’s term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder exceeded the constitutional standard for cruel or unusual punishment under People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022), and that the trial court did not consider the defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor as required by People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022). The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that: (1) the defendant is entitled to relief under People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022); and (2) the defendant is entitled to relief under People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022).
168159
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Marilyn J. Day
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Matthews, C.)
DONYELLE MICHAEL BLACK, (attorney Deborah A. LaBelle)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant is serving a prison sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a rape and murder in 1987 when he was 15 years old. In Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory LWOP for a defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time of the sentencing offense violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In September 2021, the trial court held a sentencing hearing pursuant to Miller, at which the defendant offered expert testimony from a forensic psychologist, who opined that the defendant had demonstrated a capacity for rehabilitation. The trial court nevertheless reimposed a sentence of LWOP. While the defendant’s appeal of that sentence was pending in the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 138-139 (2022), which placed the burden on the prosecution to rebut a presumption that a juvenile defendant is not deserving of LWOP by clear and convincing evidence. On the parties’ stipulation, the Court of Appeals vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for a new Miller hearing to be conducted in conformity with Taylor. On remand, the prosecution moved to either compel the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by an expert of its own choosing or strike the defense expert’s testimony and written report from the record. The defendant responded that compelling him to participate in such an examination would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion and gave the defendant four weeks to either submit to an examination by the prosecution’s expert or stipulate to striking the evidence supplied by the defense expert. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in a published opinion, holding that when a defendant intends to submit an expert witness and report to the trial court that addresses any relevant Miller factor, neither the Fifth Amendment nor Const 1963, art 1, § 17 prohibits the trial court from requiring the defendant to submit to an examination by a state expert. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the constitutional bar on compelled self-incrimination precludes a sentencing court from requiring the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by the prosecution’s expert as a precondition to admitting testimony from the defendant’s psychological expert at a resentencing hearing conducted pursuant to MCL 769.25a and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), see US Const, Ams V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; (2) if not, whether the sentencing court may require the defendant to make his or her decision on whether to submit to a compelled psychological examination before the prosecution has rested its case in chief; and (3) whether the results of a compelled psychological examination are admissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief or solely as rebuttal evidence.
168680
FCA US LLC, (attorney Cynthia M. Filipovich)
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Valentine, V.)
KAMAX INC, (attorney Jason D. Killips)
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellant,
and
KAMAX MEXICO S DE RL DE CV,
Defendant.
FCA US, LLC manufactures motor vehicles and Kamax, Inc. supplies parts to FCA. The primary issue in this case is whether the contract between the parties, which permits FCA to purchase approximately 65%-100% of its requirements from Kamax, is a “release-by-release” contract or a “requirements” contract containing a sufficiently specific quantity term to satisfy the statute of frauds codified in the Uniform Commercial Code at MCL 440.2201(1). Kamax claims that under the decision in MSSC, Inc v Airboss Flexible Prods Co, 511 Mich 176 (2023), the contract is a release-by-release contract, and Kamax stopped deliveries to FCA in February 2024. FCA sued Kamax for specific performance, breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and an injunction. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction compelling Kamax to continue delivering parts to FCA. Kamax filed counterclaims for unjust enrichment and conversion and moved for summary disposition and to dissolve the injunction. The trial court denied the motion for summary disposition and declined to dissolve the injunction, thus requiring Kamax to continue delivering parts to FCA. The trial court concluded that the contract was an enforceable requirements contract under the reasoning in Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc v Tubular Metal Sys, LLC, 331 Mich App 416 (2020). Kamax filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals and a bypass application in the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court denied the bypass application and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, Kamax filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc v Tubular Metal Sys, LLC, 331 Mich App 416 (2020), remains good law after the Court’s decision in MSSC, Inc v Airboss Flexible Prods Co, 511 Mich 176 (2023); and (2) whether a written contract for approximately 65-100% of a buyer’s requirements satisfies the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code’s statute of frauds, MCL 440.2201(1).
Wednesday, April 8
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
167532-3
MOHAMMED ABDULLA, (attorney Steven Hicks)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
PRECISE MRI OF MICHIGAN, LLC,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Hathaway, D.)
PROGRESSIVE SOUTHEASTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, and MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN,
Defendants,
and
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Mary Massaron)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY, (attorney Katharine Gostek)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff is a commercial truck driver who was injured while operating a tractor-trailer that collided with another tractor-trailer in Missouri. He was living with his parents in Michigan at the time of the accident. The plaintiff is seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the Michigan no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. The tractor was registered in Michigan and titled to Tornado Trucking, LLC, a limited-liability company solely owned by the plaintiff. The trailer was titled to Land Trucking, LLC. Pursuant to a lease agreement, Land Trucking leased Tornado Trucking’s tractor and Tornado Trucking transported cargo for Land Trucking. The plaintiff was the only person who drove the tractor. If the plaintiff is deemed to be an owner of the tractor within the meaning of MCL 500.3101(3), he would not be entitled to PIP benefits because he did not maintain the required insurance on the tractor. The trial court held that the plaintiff was not an owner of the tractor and further held that he is entitled to PIP benefits from Auto Club Group Insurance Company, which provided his father with a no-fault insurance policy that included PIP coverage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the plaintiff was an “owner” of the motor vehicle at issue within the meaning of MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i), see Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich 524, 530-532 (2004); and (2) whether the plaintiff is entitled to personal protection insurance benefits as a relative of the named insured domiciled in the same household, see MCL 500.3111, MCL 500.3114.
168010-1
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Nicholas Johnson)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Emmet CC - Deegan, J.)
RICHARD EDWARD KLUNGLE, (attorney Michael Waldo)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant lived in his grandmother’s home for approximately five years before she died without a will. The home passed to her children, who wanted to sell it. The defendant refused to leave, so his uncle had him evicted. Police officers came to enforce the eviction, but the defendant resisted. The officers had to drag the defendant out of the home, culminating in his arrest. During booking, the defendant told the officers they needed to be shot in the face. The prosecution charged the defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender with two counts of resisting and obstructing a police officer and one count of trespass. At trial, during closing arguments, defense counsel effectively conceded the defendant’s guilt to the trespassing charge. The defendant was convicted of all three offenses and was sentenced to 2 to 15 years in prison for each resisting and obstructing conviction and a 90-day jail term for trespassing. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether trial counsel’s concession of the defendant’s guilt to trespassing deprived the defendant of his right to counsel and of the autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert his innocence. See McCoy v Louisiana, 584 US 414, 417 (2018); Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175 (2004).
Thursday, April 9
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
168009
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Daniel Hebel)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Bazzi, M.)
GWENDOLYN JOSEPHINE ALEXANDER, (attorney Michael Mittlestat
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was criminally charged with child abuse and torture as a result of allegations following a welfare check that she physically disciplined her six-year-old son by binding his wrists and ankles using zip ties in order to control the child’s alleged misbehavior. Dr. Dena Nazer, medical director of Kids-TALK Children’s Advocacy Center at Wayne State University, testified at trial that she diagnosed the child as suffering from medical torture. A Wayne County jury convicted the defendant of torture, second-degree child abuse, second-degree child abuse in the presence of another child, and third-degree child abuse. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 17 to 30 years in prison for the torture conviction and lesser sentences for the other convictions. The defendant argued on appeal, among other things, that Dr. Nazer’s diagnosis that the child suffered from medical torture invaded the province of the jury. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but vacated her sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing due to errors in scoring the offense variables. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the prosecution’s medical expert invaded the province of the jury by using the phrase “medical torture” to label her diagnosis of the child complainant.
168356
McKENNA FROWNFELTER, (attorney Phillip Serafini
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Rowe, K.)
ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Aaron W. Hinman)
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellee,
and
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY, FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, (atrorney Christopher P. Endres)
Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.
—————
168357
McKENNA FROWNFELTER, (attorney Phillip Serafini
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Rowe, K.)
COREY FROWNFELTER, AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorneys Christopher P. Endres, Aaron W. Hinman)
Defendants-Appellees.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident when she was 15 years old while a passenger in a car driven by her brother and owned by her father, Corey Frownfelter, who was insured under policies issued by Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, and Farmers Insurance Company. The plaintiff had spent the previous night at her father’s house. Her parents had a custody order that provided for joint physical custody, but the plaintiff lived with her mother (Stephanie Lawrence) approximately 75% of the time and her father the other 25%. Lawrence was insured by Auto-Owners Insurance Company. A dispute arose over which insurer was highest in priority to pay no-fault benefits, with plaintiff filing suit against Esurance and Esurance filing a third-party complaint against Progressive, Farmers, and Auto-Owners. Esurance moved for summary disposition of the plaintiff’s case, arguing that she was domiciled with her mother as a matter of law at the time of the accident, making Auto-Owners the highest priority insurer pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1). The trial court denied Esurance’s motion and granted Auto-Owners’ request for judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). The plaintiff also filed an action against her father and his insurers, seeking non-economic damages under MCL 500.3135 for injuries sustained in the accident. The parties disputed whether a “step-down” provision in the Esurance policy applied, which would lower bodily injury liability coverage from $250,000 to $20,000. The plaintiff moved for summary disposition on that issue, arguing that the provision did not apply and Esurance was liable for the full $250,000 because she was not a “resident” of her father’s home at the time of the accident. The trial court denied that motion. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed each of the trial court’s rulings in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the lower courts erred in concluding that: (1) the appellant was domiciled with her father, Corey Frownfelter, at the time of the January 8, 2020 motor vehicle accident, see Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 512 n 78 (2013); but see id. at 516-519 (Zahra, J., concurring); and (2) the appellant was a resident of Frownfelter’s household at the time of the accident.
168462
KERAN ERNEST, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF MAURICE ERNEST, (attorney Paul Matouka)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Genesee CC - Bell, C.)
PAUL W. BROWN, JR., M.D., ELMAHDI M. SAEED, CYPRESS CARDIOLOGY, PLLC, and McLAREN HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, (attorney Timothy A. Diemer)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DR. FAROUK M. BELAL,
Defendant.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants committed medical malpractice on July 16, 2020. The complaint was filed on August 14, 2023, outside the two-year limitations period. But the plaintiff asserts that her complaint was timely because the wrongful-death savings provision, MCL 600.5852, permits a personal representative to file suit within two years of the date the letters of authority were issued and because she is entitled to 182 days of tolling under MCL 600.2912b, which provides for tolling when a notice of intent to sue (NOI) is sent to a defendant. The defendants moved for summary disposition on the basis of Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004), in which the Court held that sending an NOI does not toll the wrongful-death savings period. The trial court followed Waltz and granted the motions for summary disposition. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals and filed a bypass application in the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court denied the bypass application, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004), correctly held that MCL 600.5856(c) does not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions provided in MCL 600.5852; and (2) if Waltz was incorrectly decided, whether it should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468 (2000).
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